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Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters
Robert H. Sitkofff
This Article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-
standing discrimination against corporate political speech. This Article also explores the relevance
of state law regulation of corporate political speech to the competition between the states for cor-
porate charters The underlying aim of this Article is to bring to bear on the relevant policy debates
a shift in focus from the shareholder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship be-
tween lawmakers and society. The Article draws on the contractarian view of the firm, the eco-
nomic theory of regulation, and the study of public choice.
INTRODUcTION
With the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, Congress made it a
crime for corporations to make financial contributions to candidates
for federal office. In its present form, 2 USC § 441b, the Act bars not
only direct corporate "contributions" to the campaigns of federal po-
litical candidates, but also corporate "independent expenditures" on
their behal 2 Analogous restrictions appear in the election codes of
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1 Pub L No 59-36,34 Stat 864, ch 420 (1907).
2 2 USC § 441b (1997). "Independent expenditures" is a campaign finance term of art that
refers to the act of funding speech that, although advocating the election or defeat of a specific
candidate, is nevertheless uncoordinated with any specific candidate's campaign. See Buckley v
Valeo, 424 US 1, 19-23 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining the difference between "contributions"
and "independent expenditures"). By focusing on direct contributions and independent expendi-
tures, these restrictions relate only to "hard money." The practice of donating money to political
parties, which is in contrast commonly called "soft money," remains largely unregulated. See
Mariani v United States, 212 F3d 761,767-69 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc); Note, Soft Money: The Cur-
rent Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 Harv L Rev 1323,1324-26 (1998). See also Part 1V.A.
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about thirty states,' and these state statutes have a similarly venerable
historical pedigree. The vintage of this regulation of corporate politi-
cal speech distinguishes it from most modem campaign finance regu-
lation, which for the most part traces its roots to the Watergate era.'
The regulation of corporate political speech is also distinguished by its
severity. Since Buckley v Valeo,6 the Supreme Court has struck down
every limitation on independent expenditures that it has reviewed ex-
cept for one: the absolute ban contained in section 441b.
This Article explores the underlying policy bases for, and the po-
litical economy of, the law's ongoing discrimination against corporate
political speech. This Article also explores the relevance of the state
law discrimination against corporate political speech for the corporate
regulatory competition debate. Putting the First Amendment policy is-
sues to one side,8 the underlying aim of this Article is to shift the focus
3 See Edward D. Feigenbaum and James A. Palmer, Campaign Finance Law 2000: A
Summary of State Campaign Finance Laws with Quick Reference Charts Chart 2-A (2000), avail-
able online at <http:lwww.fec.gov/pageslcfllOOchart2A.htm> (visited Aug 14, 2001). See also
Susan L. Ross, Note, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with
Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U Ill L Rev 445, 470-72 (1985). An examination of Feigenbaum and
Palmer's Chart 2-A reveals that a substantial number of states continues to regulate corporate
political speech more severely than that of individuals.
4 Earl R. Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation 279-83 (Duke 1928) (list-
ing states that prohibited corporate contributions near the turn of the century).
5 See Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns Congress, and the Courts: The Making of Federal Cam-
paign Finance Law xvii (Praeger 1988) (calling the Tillman Act the "first federal campaign
finance law").
6 424 US 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7 Although the Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of 2 USC § 441b as applied to
business corporations, it has upheld a state law modeled on section 441b, Austin v Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 655 n 1 (1990), and there is no reason to suppose that sec-
tion 441b would be treated any differently. See Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d 261,278 (4th Cir 2002)
(declining to find section 441b facially unconstitutional); Mariani v United States, 212 F3d 761,
772-73 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to section 441b). See also
Athens Lumber Co v FEC, 718 F2d 363,363 (11th Cir 1983) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding sec-
tion 441b constitutional). But see Montana Chamber of Commerce v Argenbright, 226 F3d 1049,
1057-58 (9th Cir 2000) (finding that a Montana initiative prohibiting direct corporate expendi-
tures in ballot initiative campaigns violated the First Amendment).
8 See, for example, Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: In-
corporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 Wash U L Q
1 (2001); Martin H. Redish, Money Talks 63-114 (NYU 2001); Adam Winkler, The Corporation
in Election Law, 32 Loyola LA L Rev 1243 (1999); Martin H. Redish and Howard M.
Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expres-
sion, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 235 (1998); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate
Speech Is Not Free, 83 Iowa L Rev 995 (1998); Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, The Cor-
poration and the Constitution 59-78 (AEI 1995); Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech:
Protection for Shareholders or Abridgement of Expression?, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 305 (1993);
Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 109 (1992); Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, A Pattemless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment after Austin, 21
Cap U L Rev 381 (1992); Nicole Bremner Casarez, Corruption, Corrosion, and Corporate Politi-
cal Speech, 70 Neb L Rev 689 (1991); Miriam Cytryn, Comment, Defining the Specter of Corrup-
tion: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 57 Brooklyn L Rev 903 (1991); Jill E.
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of the relevant policy debates from the shareholder/manager agency
relationship to the society/lawmaker agency relationship,9 analysis of
the latter being informed by the study of public choice. ' Specifically,
this Article advances four claims in its four Parts. The latter three rep-
resent the Article's more original contributions to the existing litera-
ture.
In Part I, drawing on the contractarian approach to the study of
corporate governance," this Article contends that the conventional
justifications for discriminating against corporate political speech are
generally unpersuasive. To the extent that they depend on a significant
divergence of interests between shareholders and managers (and most
do), the conventional justifications are vulnerable on that ground.
There is nothing special about the agency problem associated with
managerial control over corporate political speech that distinguishes it
from any other area of managerial discretion. Hence, there is no obvi-
ous reason to abandon the usual tools of corporate governance in fa-
vor of a mandatory rule and criminalization.
The only argument growing out of the conventional approaches
to this issue that does not depend on significant shareholder/manager
agency costs is the fear of managerial lobbying for redistributive legis-
lation-that is, corporate rent seeking. This concern has purchase be-
cause redistributive corporate rent seeking is socially undesirable and
yet rational investors might favor it. Drawing on the relevant collec-
Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Traib'An Approach to Regulation of Corporate
Political Expenditures, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 587 (1991); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate and
Corporate Speech, 18 Hastings Const L Q 541 (1991); Michael J. Merrick, The Saga Continues-
Corporate Political Free Speech and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 24 Creighton L Rev 195 (1990); Ross, Note, 1985 U III L Rev
445 (cited in note 3); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expendi-
tures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 646 (1982); Victor Brudney, Busi-
ness Corporations and Stockholders' Rights under the First Amendment, 91 Yale L J 235 (1981);
John R. Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech,
22 Ariz L Rev 373 (1980); Loren A. Smith, Business; Buck$ & Bulk The Corporation, the First
Amendment & the Corrupt Practices Law, 4 Del J Corp L 39 (1978); David A. Grossberg, Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures, 42 U Chi L Rev 148 (1974); Jeremiah D. Lambert, Corporate Political Spend-
ing and Campaign Finance, 40 NYU L Rev 1033 (1965); Edwin M. Epstein, Corporations Con-
tributions; and Political Campaigns: Federal Regulation in Perspective (Berkeley 1958).
9 Agency is used here as an economic rather than a legal term of art. See, for example, Mi-
chael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs; and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fm Econ 305,308 (1976) (setting forth an economic defini-
tion of agency and defining "agency costs" as the sum of the various losses that stem from the
misalignment of interests between principal and agent).
10 See generally Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice:A Critical
Introduction 12-37 (Chicago 1991) (examining the public choice literature on interest groups
and lawmakers).
11 The classic exposition is Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 1991).
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tive action dynamics and the economic theory of regulation,2 this Ar-
ticle contends that the only plausible part of the conventional justifi-
cation for discriminating against corporate political speech is that do-
ing so might represent an appropriate response to the competitive ad-
vantages provided by the corporate form in the market for legislation.
It is an argument, in other words, that corporations might be particu-
larly pernicious rent seekers. This possibly might justify discriminating
against corporate political speech. Crucially, the basis of this concern
is not the agency between managers and shareholders, but rather a
public choice view of the agency between lawmakers and society.
Part II offers a political economy story for the Tillman Act's en-
actment that is consistent with the notion, advanced in Part I, that the
corporate form might provide competitive advantages in the market
for legislation. Part II contends that the statutes were probably sup-
ported by corporations, and this for two reasons. First, again drawing
on the relevant collective action dynamics and the economic theory of
regulation, Part II suggests that the statutes represent a solution to the
collective action problem faced by individual corporations if the redis-
tributive lobbying by corporations as a class for the most part victim-
ized other corporations. For if corporate political activity represents
both offensive and defensive lobbying anent redistributive legislation,
then corporations as a class might do better with a flat ban on corpo-
rate campaign contributions. On this view, the statutes solve the col-
lective action problem by enforcing concerted action.
Second, drawing on a fresh look at the historical record in view of
the modern learning on the economic theory of regulation,3 Part II
contends that the statutes might lessen the ability of elected officials
to extort corporations (and thus by extension shareholders), because
they proscribe the most direct forms of support. That is, the statutes
might weaken the ability of elected officials to extract campaign dona-
tions from corporations by threatening and then forbearing from leg-
islative action that would be harmful to the interests of those corpora-
tions. Thus, even if these laws facilitate rather than frustrate
12 See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Michigan 1962);
Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Har-
vard 1965); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3
(1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976);
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q J
Econ 371 (1983).
13 See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political
Extortion 12-13 (Harvard 1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987). See also Fred S. McChesney, "Pay to
Play" Politics Examined, with Lessons for Campaign-Finance Reform, 6 Indep Rev 345 (2002).
Compare David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum L
Rev 1369, 1380-82 (1994); David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?,
1995 U Chi Legal F 141,152-55.
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attempts by large corporations to seek rents through redistributive
legislation (by reducing corporate exposure to extortive ultimatums),
the statutes may still be defended on the alternative ground that by
preventing extortion they preserve the socially desirable incentive for
innovation. The statutes ensure that the increased profits which stem
from that innovation flow to shareholders rather than elected officials.
Part III assimilates the modem learning on the economic theory
of regulation into the corporate regulatory competition debate and in
the process further develops the existing literature's application of the
traditional model. The aim of Part III is to offer a more nuanced ap-
proach to evaluating the comparative advantage in the competition
for corporate charters provided by Delaware's unique political econ-
omy. Specifically, Part III contends that the political economy of the
Tillman Act and its state law analogues suggested in Part II is consis-
tent with the fact that Delaware, the dominant state of incorporation
for most large, publicly traded corporations, is among the minority of
states that does not discriminate against corporate political speech.
Part III also contends that, in view of the modem learning on the eco-
nomic theory of regulation, Delaware's lack of any corporation-
specific campaign finance regulation, coupled with certain unique in-
stitutional features of the Delaware corporate lawmaking process,
gives additional traction to the "credible commitment" explanation
for Delaware's ongoing dominance in the competition for corporate
charters."'
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the foregoing analy-
sis for three current policy debates. First, Part IV briefly discusses the
current political debate over whether to ban corporate (and other)
soft-money donations. Second, Part IV briefly discusses the burgeon-
ing academic debate about issuer choice of law in securities regula-
tion. Finally, Part IV ends with a comprehensive analysis of the perti-
nence of this Article to the current academic debate over the enact-
ment of an optional federal corporate takeover law regime. This more
comprehensive analysis may be viewed as a case study, as it were, in
the application of this Article's analysis to other problems.
14 The "credible commitment" explanation is most closely associated with Roberta
Romano. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J
L, Econ, & Org 225 (1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
Cardozo L Rev 709,721-24 (1987); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law
37-38 (AEI 1993) ("Delaware's preeminence in the corporate charter market results from its
ability to resolve credibly the commitment problem in relational contracting.").
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I. WHY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH?
The usual policy justifications for section 441b and its state ana-
logues, as adduced by legislators,'5 courts,'6 and commentators,'7 can be
separated into two categories: first, that corporate donations produce
bad politics, and second, that corporate donations harm shareholders.
Hence the first is usually perceived as a political problem whereas the
second is usually perceived as a problem of corporate governance. As
we shall see, however, in a world without shareholder/manager agency
costs much (though not all) of the distinction between the two strands
collapses.'8 Still, there is pedagogical utility to the distinction, and it
will be followed here.
A. Bad Politics
There are two variations on the argument that corporate political
speech produces bad politics. The first depends on irrational investors
and/or a gross misalignment of interests between shareholders and
managers, whereas the second depends on a misalignment of interests
between society and lawmakers. This Part contends that the second
variant has far more cogency than the first. Indeed, except for a fear of
the competitive advantages in rent seeking afforded by the corporate
form (for in rent seeking the interests of shareholders and society di-
verge and one need not suppose irrational investors), the bad politics
argument amounts to nothing more than a complaint that people with
more money can buy more speech. But that is no reason to limit all
corporate political speech. It is rather an argument either for limiting
15 Note the reference to "legislators," not "legislatures." The difference is important, be-
cause I do not wish to suggest that legislation is necessarily the product of a unified and public-
regarding legislative effort. See generally William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Inde-
pendent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 876 (1975) ("[P]ublic pol-
icy emerges from the struggle of interest groups."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50
U Chi L Rev 533, 547 (1983) (claiming that legislatures do not have intents or designs); Jonathan
R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223,227-33 (1986) (describing how legislation is a product of in-
terest group deals).
16 The critical modem decisions are Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652
(1990); FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc, 479 US 238, 245-46, 255 (1986); FEC v Na-
tional Right to Work Committee, 459 US 197,201 (1982); First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,
435 US 765,776 (1977).
17 See note 8. Perhaps the most influential commentator has been Professor Victor Brud-
ney. See Brudney, 91 Yale L J 235 (cited in note 8) (discussing the regulation of corporate politi-
cal speech). An Austin concurrence cited him authoritatively, see Austin, 494 US at 675 (Brennan
concurring), citing Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 247, and nearly all of the commentary addresses his
views.
18 See generally Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 309-10 (cited in note 9) (defining
agency costs with respect to corporate law); Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property (MacMillan 1932) (exploring the "separation of
ownership and control" in large business corporations).
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the political speech of all the wealthy, including people and other
business associations in addition to corporations, or for subsidizing the
political speech of the poor. This leaves only the fear of corporate rent
seeking-and the society/lawmaker agency problem that animates it-
as a plausible justification for discriminating against corporate politi-
cal speech with a mandatory prohibition.
1. "Immense wealth" and "special advantages."
The first bad politics justification for discriminating against cor-
porate political speech, to borrow the articulation of the Supreme
Court in Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 9 is that the state
endows corporations with "special advantages," such as "limited liabil-
ity, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets," that when taken together permit corporations
to amass "immense aggregations of wealth ... that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas." So restrictions on corporate speech, the theory goes, offset the
"unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amass-
ing of large treasuries.' 2' The implicit premise of this rationale is the
idea that, without government regulation, corporations would in fact
deploy their "large treasuries" in the political marketplace in such
force as to become a "corrosive and distorting" influence on elec-
tions.2
But managers who divert corporate resources from profit-making
activities towards funding political campaigns on such a grand level as
to warrant the characterization "corrosive and distorting" will find
their firm's "large treasuries" shrinking as the firm becomes less com-
petitive in its product and the capital markets.2 And perpetual life cuts
in precisely the opposite direction than the Court supposed-it solves
the "last period" problem. As a class, managers must always look for-
ward to tomorrow's product and capital market competition.24
True, limited liability does help managers obtain capital. But it
does so only by capping investors' personal liability to creditors of the
corporation at the amount of the investors' investment. Limited liabil-
ity does not shield the corporation itself from liability for its debts.2' So
19 494 US 652 (1990).
20 Id at 658-59.
21 Id at 660. See also FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 479 US 238,257-59 (1986);
FEC v National Right to Work Committee, 459 US 197,207-08 (1982); Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d
261,271-72 (4th Cir 2002).
22 Austin, 494 US at 660. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
23 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 72-73 (cited in note 8).
24 Individual managers close to retirement, however, may not. But that is an agency prob-
lem. See Part II.B.
25 On limited liability, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability,
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to suppose that limited liability will help an incorporated firm amass a
huge treasury for use in electoral campaigns is to suppose investor ir-
rationality. Who would invest in a company that, rather than promis-
ing handsome returns, merely hands over the corporate treasury to
political candidates? The answer is only those investors who prefer the
corporation's political speech over larger dividends or stock price ap-
preciation -unless, as discussed below, the political activity represents
narrowly targeted rent seeking that increases the firm's profits, or
unless the market is uninformed about campaign donations and so
cannot police managers. Putting the former qualification to one side
for the moment, the latter does not damage the thesis. That scenario, if
it were accurate, at best argues for disclosure rather than dollar limita-
tions as a legislative solution. For in a thick capital market in which
that information was known, the fact of the corporation's political do-
nations would be impounded into the market price of its stock.2' In
other words, disclosure is all that is required to ensure that the size of
the corporation's treasury available for political activity lines up with
its investors' support for that activity.-
The point is not that the corporation's financial strength will
match the numerical strength of its views within the general popula-
tion, in an egalitarian-distribution-of-resources sense. But the same is
true for any person, or unincorporated association of persons, of
means. Egalitarianism is not a good reason for curtailing corporate po-
litical speech but not the political speech of wealthy individuals or
other unincorporated business entities. Indeed, discriminating against
52 U Chi L Rev 89,89-90 (1985); Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure at 40-41 (cited in
note 11); Chester Rohrlich, Organizing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises § 5.02 at 175-
76 (Matthew Bender 1999).
26 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 112 Harv L Rev 1197,1199 (1999). Professor Williams suggests that corporate dis-
closure could be used to enforce corporate social responsibility. See id at 1310-11. Among other
things, therefore, she suggests an explicit disclosure of corporate expenditures on political activ-
ity. See id.
27 See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 Colum L Rev 1335,1361 (1996) (concluding that the integrity of U.S. capi-
tal markets ensures that stock prices reflect managerial performance).
28 Disclosure and the ensuing disciplining force of the market dominate governance
mechanisms such as the submission of specific expenditures to a shareholder vote. Compare Ian
Ramsay, Geof Stapledon, and Joel Vernan, Political Donations by Australian Companies 4-5,31-
32, working paper (2001), available online at <http://papers.ssm.com/id=286112> (visited Feb 15,
2002) (suggesting that corporations should disclose prior to contribution so investors may make
informed decisions as to voting and investing); Victor Brudney and Allen Ferrell, Corporate
Charitable Giving, 69 U Chi L Rev 1191, 1210, 1212 n 52 (2002). This is because at this level of
specificity shareholder views are not single-peaked and thus invite the well-known voting pa-
thologies of agenda manipulation and cycling. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel,
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J L & Econ 395, 405-06 (1983); Roberta Romano, Answering the
Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum L Rev 1599,1611-
12(1989).
1110 [69:1103
Competition for Corporate Charters
corporate political speech might be anti-egalitarian, because it would
take away from individuals the ability to organize in a form that
would allow them to engage efficiently in collective action.2
At any rate, egalitarianism is not the policy that the Supreme
Court invoked when it referred to "corrosive" corporate wealth. The
Court's justification for singling out corporations was that managers
could amass huge treasuries as a result of corporate economic activi-
ties and state-conferred advantages, treasuries that had little to do
with the political support for the positions that managers might cause
the corporation to take, and so managers could distort the nation's po-
litical discourse.3 But, to repeat, assuming disclosure, the only way
managers of a large, publicly traded corporation could amass a huge
treasury for political activities is if investors favored those activities.
Publicly traded corporations-unlike individuals such as Ross Perot
(who spent $63.5 million of his own money in his unsuccessful 1992
presidential campaign), Steve Forbes (who spent $38.7 million of his
own money in his unsuccessful 2000 presidential campaign), Jon Corz-
ine (who spent $63 million of his own money for one of New Jersey's
two seats in the U.S. Senate), and Michael Bloomberg (who spent
$68.9 million of his own money in 2001 to become Mayor of New
York),3' and unlike other unincorporated entities-are subject to the
disciplining force of capital markets.
This is true even if the corporation holds a monopoly in its prod-
uct market, perhaps because it holds all of the relevant patents. Cor-
porations, after all, are artificial persons that are no more than a nexus
or web of express, implied, and metaphorical contracts.3 Shareholders
29 See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan L Rev 923,992-
93 (1984) ("[P]luralism's organizational dimension [ ] sees a need for individuals to organize into
groups" as a means of engaging in collective action, including individuals who have "ordered
their affairs in business firms."). See also Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitu-
tion at 66 n 49 (cited in note 8) ("Shareholders could, of course, form their own interest groups to
oppose those of managers. But the shareholders' groups, unlike 'corporate' PACs, would have to
bear their own organization costs. These costs, together with the free-rider problem inherent in
collective action, would inhibit such efforts.").
30 See Austin, 494 US at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 US at 258:
Resources in the treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically moti-
vated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a
corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may
be no reflection of the power of its ideas.
31 See Michael Cooper, At $92.60 a Vote Bloomberg Shatters an Election Record, NY Times
Al, A20 (Dec 4, 2001); Tom Hamburger, Who Wants a Multimillionaire?: Democrats, to Help Win
Senate, vall St J A28 (Oct 19,2000).
32 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 Colum L Rev 1416, 1425-26 (1989); Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 310-11 (cited in
note 9); Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Cost.s and Economic
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are the marginal or residual claimants in this arrangement, so every
additional dollar spent on political activities is a dollar less for the
shareholders. If they tolerate such an arrangement, it must be because
they are willing to tolerate the political activities of the corporation.
Against this it might be argued that market checks are effective
only against large corporations, which means that smaller firms would
still be free to distort the political marketplace. But private contrac-
tual solutions and shareholder monitoring are easier in smaller corpo-
rations.3 What is more, smaller firms by definition do not have the re-
sources to "distort." The more "immense" a corporation's "aggrega-
tion of wealth," and so the greater the potential for "corrosion," the
stronger the market-based checks on its managers' behavior.
2. Corporate rent seeking.
The second variation on the bad politics rationale for section
441b is that it represents an appropriate response to corporate rent
seeking via lobbying for redistributive legislation. There is much to be
said for this second variation on the bad politics worry, because it does
not require an assumption that investors are irrational. Rational in-
vestors might happily tolerate managers' making campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures when the marginal return on those payments-
the rents, that is, which come from the private interest governmental
action that the spending purchases -exceeds the marginal return on
directing that money to any other use.-" Thus, rather than reckless cor-
porate political spending, efficient markets should prompt what is,
from the corporation's perspective, efficient rent seeking. Of course,
from the perspective of society this is undesirable, because obtaining
rents through redistributive regulation merely reallocates rather than
increases social wealth. Worse, it comes at the cost of deadweight lob-
bying expenses and possibly the forgoing of other social-wealth-
maximizing opportunities.! So this rationale for limiting corporate
campaign expenditures has some purchase. Importantly, however, this
rationale does not require a misalignment of interests between share-
Organization, 62 Am Econ Rev 777,787-789 (1972).
33 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 Stan L Rev 271, 280-83 (1986); Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of
Statutes, 70 Wash U L Q 365,378-83 (1992).
34 As a class, however, shareholders might prefer no lobbying at all. See text accompanying
notes 55 and 86.
35 Compare Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 148 (cited in note 8) (stating that for-profit
firms will invest in nonpolitical activity if the "return from doing so exceeds that from investing
in political activities").
36 See, for example, McChesney, Money for Nothing at 9-17 (cited in note 13) (outlining
the traditional economic theory of regulation and discussing the social costs of rent seeking un-
der it).
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holders and managers. Instead, its basis is a public choice view of the
agency relationship between society and lawmakers.
There is, moreover, a plausible argument that the corporate form
furnishes a competitive advantage in the market for legislation. If cor-
rect, this would justify singling out corporations for special treatment.
The argument runs as follows: The chief impediments to effective lob-
bying are the collective action and free rider problems that stem from
the fact that regulation is something of a public good. But the corpo-
rate form provides a simple way to channel rents to only those who
have paid their dues, as it were. If you do not own stock, you do not
benefit from the larger dividends or appreciation in the stock price
caused by the passage of private interest legislation.3 And for an al-
ready existing corporation, the fixed costs of organizing into the cor-
porate form are sunk.39 Thus, if the corporate form does in fact provide
a comparative advantage in the market for legislation, we should ex-
pect the deadweight losses associated with corporate rent seeking to
be particularly large, which in turn justifies targeting corporation-
specific rent seeking in particular. Put into the parlance of doctrinal
analysis, this amounts to an argument that the state's interest in pre-
venting corporations from seeking rents via lobbying for redistributive
legislation is significantly stronger than its interest in preventing the
seeking of similar rents by others, because the seeking of such rents
through the corporate form is far more destructive. We shall return to
this point later."
B. Harming Shareholders
The second style of argument in favor of discriminating against
corporate political speech is that doing so is necessary to protect
shareholders from managerial opportunism-that is, these rules help
police the agency problem between managers and shareholders. This
Part contends that there is nothing special about the agency problem
inherent in managers' control over corporate political speech that dis-
tinguishes it from any other area of managerial discretion so as to
warrant a specialized mandatory rule and criminalization.
37 For a general discussion, see Buchanan and Tulock, The Calculus of Consent (cited in
note 12); Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (cited in note 12).
38 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 318-20 (cited in note 8) (discussing factors that
will hamper collective action). See also Romano, 36 Stan L Rev at 992-93 (cited in note 29).
39 Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Tollison, Politicians; Legislation, and the Economy:
An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government 17 (Martinus Nijhoff 1981) (noting the
comparative advantage of groups that have already organized); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P
Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy 52 (vest 3d ed 2001) (same).
40 See Part II.A.
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1. Election codes and the "internal affairs doctrine."
An initial and immediate objection to all the variations on the
shareholder/manager agency costs rationale for discriminating against
corporate political speech is that all state law corporation-specific
campaign finance limitations are found in the election laws of the
states, not in their corporate codes.41 This creates an odd asymmetry
whereby the shareholders of all corporations, wherever they might be
incorporated, are "protected" against managers making corporate do-
nations within a state that has enacted one of these statutes, but
shareholders of firms incorporated in such a state are not necessarily
protected against managers' political spending outside that state. Had
these rules been included in the states' corporate codes, however, then
by operation of the choice of law rule known as the "internal affairs
doctrine,12 the statutes would bar political spending by managers eve-
rywhere, not just within jurisdictions that had included such a ban in
their election codes. The failure to include these provisions in state
corporate codes therefore strongly suggests that they were not moti-
vated by a worry about the efficacy of more traditional means of cor-
porate governance to police this dimension of the agency between41
shareholders and managers. The presence of these provisions in state
election rather than state corporate codes is, however, explainable by
the political economy analysis offered later in this Article."
2. Misappropriation.
The first commonly advanced shareholder protection rationale
for section 441b is that it is essential to protect all shareholders from
the theft-effectively the looting-of their assets. President Theodore
Roosevelt, for example, urged in a 1905 message to Congress that "di-
rectors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money" for po-
litical purposes, and Members of Congress used words like "embezzle"
41 It is also worth noting that the relevant portion of the Model Business Corporation Act
expressly permits spending for political purposes. See MBCA § 3.02(15) official comment (1994)
("This clause, which is in addition to and independent of the power to make charitable and simi-
lar donations under section 3.02(13), permits contributions for purposes that may not be charita-
ble, such as for political purposes or to influence elections.").
42 See, for example, Hollis v Hill, 232 F3d 460, 464-65 (5th Cir 2000) ("[T]he internal af-
fairs of the foreign corporation ... are governed by the laws of the jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion."); Nagy v Riblet Products Corp, 79 F3d 572,576 (7th Cir 1996) (Easterbrook) (same).
43 Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 143 (cited in note 8) ("The fact that the government
has acted through election statutes rather than through corporation statutes indicates that the
statutes are intended as direct speech restrictions rather than as shareholder protection that only
indirectly impacts speech."); Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 315 n 83 (cited in note 8);
Lowenstein, 21 Cap U L Rev at 408 (cited in note 8); Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and
the Constitution at 67 (cited in note 8).
44 See Part II.B.
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to characterize such activity.4' An initial response is simply to rehash
many of the arguments previously urged, that the various markets
within which managers operate-capital, product, and corporate con-
trol-will sufficiently align managers' interests with that of sharehold-
ers to ensure that managers will not spend money on speech contrary
to the wishes of shareholders.46
Still, one could argue with some force that the various markets
within which managers operate provide enough slack for them to get
away with some political spending, a gap not closed by governance
mechanisms because of their costs. In other words, we live in a world
with agency costs. This argument, however, applies with equal force to
any seemingly non-profit-maximizing activity undertaken by manag-
ers within this space. So it fails to explain why this particular form of
managerial discretion-that is, why this particular dimension of the
shareholder/manager agency problem-requires not only special legis-
lation but also a mandatory rule and criminalization. The critical ques-
tion, in other words, is whether there is any reason to suppose that the
usual corporate governance checks on the shareholder/manager
agency problem will be unusually ineffective in this context. There are
four related points to be made here.
First, the market must be aware of this slack, so stock prices
should be discounted accordingly. Related, in the absence of a manda-
tory proscription, investors could have sought a private contractual so-
lution such as a "no politics" charter provision. This is not a fanciful
notion. A number of large corporations-including General Motors,
Ford Motors, Monsanto, Time Warner, Dell, Cisco, and IBM-have
announced a policy against giving soft-money donations, and this
group is growing.47 Given that soft-money donations were unregulated
45 President's Annual Message, 59th Cong, 1st Sess, in 40 Cong Rec S 96 (Dee 5,1905); Bol-
ton, 22 Ariz L Rev at 376-79 (cited in note 8) (recounting the congressional debate about and
President Theodore Roosevelt's concern over protecting shareholders from managers' spending
corporate funds for political purposes). For example, Congressman Williams said:
[No board of directors of a corporation and no manager ... has the right, to embezzle the
money belonging to the stockholders of the corporation and to divert it from its legitimate
use to a purpose for which the company was not chartered by appropriating it to Democ-
ratic, Republican, Populist, Socialist, or any other campaign fund.
Hearings on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other Campaigns before
the House Committee on the Election of the President, Vice-President, and Representatives in
Congress, 59th Cong, 1st Sess 76 (1906).
46 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 309 (cited in note 8); Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L
Rev at 138-40 (cited in note 8). See also Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitu-
tion at 59-78 (cited in note 8).
47 See Don Van Natta, Jr., As Political Gifts Set a Record Pace; Some Quit Giving, NY
Times Al (May 2,2000) (citing General Motors, Monsanto, and Time Warner as having policies
against giving soft-money donations); Paula Dwyer and Nicole St. Pierre, Who's Giving All That
Soft Money, Bus Wk 171 (Nov 13, 2000) (citing IBM, Cisco, and Dell as having policies against
giving soft-money donations); Deroy Murdock, Reform-Minded CEOs Pledge to Shake Free of
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at the time of these announcements, this suggests that private contrac-
tual solutions are indeed viable.
Second, a mandatory proscription is serious business. No matter
how sophisticated the shareholders and how much they might want to
permit political spending by managers, the rule of section 441b and its
state analogues is mandatory. A less drastic alternative would have
been to ban corporate political donations in the absence of a specific
charter provision authorizing them.' Something of a penalty default,'
such a rule would have ensured clear notice of the potential for politi-
cal spending without disabling such spending in all cases. Similarly,
charter provisions could have been used to ensure the specific disclo-
sure of political spending, thereby facilitating the impounding of that
information into the stock price."'
Third, there are good reasons why rational shareholders might
want to allow managers the freedom to make political donations.
Hence a mandatory proscription possibly diminishes the aggregate
welfare of shareholders as a class.-" For example, in view of the possi-
bility that the corporation will be the victim, as it were, of redistribu-
tive legislation sought by others, from the shareholders' perspective it
may be more efficient (owing to collective action and free rider prob-
lems) to have the corporation's managers engage in political activities
than to do so themselves. Managers are more likely than shareholders
to be aware of what legislation will benefit or harm the corporation.
Thus, for all the same reasons that shareholders delegate decisionmak-
ing authority regarding ordinary business judgments to managers, they
might also want to delegate authority to make political interventions.
"Casual empiricism" lends support to the view that corporate political
Political Shakedowns, Wash Times 46 (Mar 20,2000) (citing Allied Signal and Ameritech as hav-
ing stopped giving soft-money donations). See also notes 207-11 and accompanying text; Ed-
mund Sanders, Many Businesses Root for Reform to Limit Political Contributions, LA Times C1
(Apr 18,2001).
48 A suggestion offered in Fisch, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 641-42 (cited in note 8) ("[An-
other] way to handle corporate political speech is through the charter as a corporate contract.").
See also Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 64-65 (cited in note 8)
(arguing that "parties to the corporation can invest in corporate governance devices that mini-
mize divergence of interest" and that "contracts restricting managers' speech do not raise signifi-
cant First Amendment concerns").
49 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91 (1989) (defining a "penalty default" as a rule "pur-
posefully set at what the parties would not want" so as to "give at least one party ... an incentive
to contract around the [penalty] default rule").
50 See notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
51 Compare Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 142-43 (cited in note 8):
A campaign finance limit in a state corporation statute might be defended on contractual
grounds as to shareholders who invest in corporations bound by the provision.... [But] the
mandatory nature of the law would be unjustified if the laws imposed costs in excess of
benefits in many of the situations in which they applied.
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interventions are indeed "vehicles for profit maximization."'' An irony
here is that the current mandatory proscription channels corporate
political speech into other less direct forms-such as corporate
PACs-that are not subject to the usual corporate governance checks
that would have applied to the (now prohibited) direct use of corpo-
rate funds.n
Another possibility is that investors might believe that the corpo-
rate form facilitates the seeking of legislative rents. To them, spending
on politics is sometimes a more profitable alternative to spending on,
say, research and development. They want the corporation to invest in
whichever has the higher marginal rate of return. On this view, as with
corporate charitable giving-which no one seems eager to proscribe
despite the existence of the very same agency problem-there may
well be a corporate profit-maximizing and therefore pro-shareholder
rationale for corporate political speech. To be fair, however, it should
be noted that well-diversified shareholders might not appreciate this
approach to profit maximization. Well-diversified investors are equally
as likely to be on the losing side as the winning side of a redistributive
battle between incorporated firms, so on average they would be worse
off because the transfer costs represent a deadweight loss.5 Thus, from
the shareholder perspective, the issue becomes an empirical question
of whether the aggregate wealth transfers from unincorporated firms
and society at large obtained by the rent seeking efforts of manage-
ment exceed the deadweight loss of the transaction costs of wealth
transfers between incorporated firms. At any rate, unincorporated en-
tities seek legislative rents too, so well-diversified shareholders might
rationally opt to delegate responsibility for opposing the rent seeking
of others to management.
52 See Romano, 36 Stan L Rev at 995 (cited in note 29) ("Casual empiricism supports the
contention that corporate PACs and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit maximi-
zation."). Compare Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a
Political Role?, 44 J L & Econ 179, 180, 197 (2001) (suggesting that empirical data support the
conclusion that where politics plays an important role in profit maximization, some outside di-
rectors play a political role).
53 See Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 66 (cited in note 8).
54 For a general discussion on corporate charitable giving, see Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U
Chi L Rev 1191 (cited in note 28); Richard W. Painter, Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U
Chi L Rev 1219 (2002); Hemy N. Butler and Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office:
Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation,
84 Cornell L Rev 1195 (1999); Henry G. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism:
An Individualistic Model, 59 Va L Rev 708 (1973); David S. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private
Corporations, 114 U Pa L Rev 209 (1965).
55 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 64 (cited in note 8) ("Man-
agers may want to advocate wealth transfers to their own firms from others, while shareholders
would regard such transfers as shifting wealth within their portfolios while imposing dead-weight
transfer costs.").
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Fourth, there is some irony in the contrast between the law's
treatment of charitable and political donations. Although the common
law imposed some limits on managerial freedom to make charitable
donations, requiring that they be reasonable and have some connec-
tion to a corporate benefit,-' a number of states have by statute freed
managers from even that requirement.57 These states have therefore
aggravated the very same agency problem, albeit in a different con-
text, that has been suggested to be a justification for section 441b and
its state law analogues. Of course, unlike most (but surely not all7)
charitable spending, corporate efforts to obtain redistributive legisla-
tion or regulation, although possibly profit-maximizing, are neverthe-
less social welfare-reducing. Thus, if as suggested above the corporate
form affords competitive advantages in the market for legislation,
then that might be a reason to limit corporate political activity. But the
basis for that ban would be to protect society from the purchase of
special-interest regulation by corporations and their shareholders, not
to protect shareholders. The basis for that ban, in other words, would
be the society/lawmaker agency problem, not a divergence of interests
between shareholders and managers.
3. The minority shareholder.
The second commonly offered shareholder protection rationale is
the need to protect dissident shareholders-those who disagree with
56 A.P Smith Manufacturing Co v Barlow, 13 NJ 145,98 A2d 581,590 (1953); James D. Cox,
Thomas Lee Hazen, and R Hodge O'Neal, 1 Corporations § 4.4 at 4.8-4.12 (Aspen 2002).
57 See, for example, Cal Corp Code § 207(e) (West 1990) (allowing managers to "[m]ake
donations, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund,
hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes"); NY Bus Corp Law
§ 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1986) (permitting New York corporations to "make donations, irrespec-
tive of corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund, hospital, charitable, edu-
cational, scientific, civic or similar purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in
aid thereof"). See generally R. Franklin Balotti and James J. Franks, Giving at the Office: A Re-
appraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus Law 965, 970-78 (1999) (discuss-
ing state statutes).
58 For interesting examples of recent charitable giving with a rent-seeking (and possibly
extortionate) overtone, see Frank Bruni, Donors Flock to University Center Linked to Senate
Majority Leader, NY Times Al (May 18, 1999) ("An academic center under construction at the
University of Mississippi and named for Senator Trent Lott, the majority leader, is being en-
dowed with million-dollar donations from companies with huge stakes in pending Congressional
legislation."). See also Jason Zengerle, Wingate Dispatch: At Home Abroad, New Republic 18
(June 4,2001):
Helms himself has no official involvement with the [Jesse Helms Center, loosely affiliated
with Wingate University], but his wife and daughter serve on its board, and the center's
president used to raise money for Helms's political campaigns. So it's no surprise that peo-
ple seeking to show their appreciation of-or to curry favor with-Helms have been ex-
tremely generous to the center that bears his name. Various tobacco companies have con-
tributed more than $1 million; the textile magnate and ardent protectionist Roger Milliken
has given $250,000; Jack Valenti has chipped in over $10,000.
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the views "expressed by management on behalf of the corporation. '"
This rationale differs from the more traditional form of the agency
problem identified above in that it supposes authorization of the cor-
porate speech by a majority of the shareholders. The focus here is on
protecting the rights of the minority, who some think are compelled to
fund speech with which they disagree in violation of their First
Amendment right not to speak." That right's application here assumes
that shareholders are locked into their investment, and further that in
the absence of regulation all corporations will engage in political
speech. 1 But these assumptions depend on a paucity of investment
opportunities and/or opaque securities markets. These assumptions
are dubious, and not only because this risk is known and therefore as-
sumed, which means that the stock should be priced accordingly.
Take the assumption that in the absence of a statutory prohibi-
tion no firm would swear off political activity. If there are resources
held by prospective investors who are skittish about funding political
speech (perhaps because they are a church or a university) but other-
wise would be happy to invest in stock, then some firms would simply
insert "no politics" clauses into their corporate charters, or mutual
fund companies would create a "no politics" fund, to tap into this
source of capital.62 Consider the proliferation of "social responsibility"
funds. These funds assure investors that their money will not be in-
vested in corporations engaged in certain specific forms of behavior,
such as the sale of alcohol or tobacco, military contracting, abortion-
related services, and so on." There is a fund for everyone: just as the
Meyers Pride Value Fund avoids companies that lack stated policies
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Timothy
Plan funds avoid companies that provide domestic partner benefits."
What is more, as noted earlier, a number of high-profile publicly
traded corporations have pledged to forbear from soft-money dona-
59 First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765,787 (1977).
60 See Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209,234-35 (1977); West Virginia State
Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 634-35 (1943). Compare Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v Southworth, 529 US 217,229-31 (2000).
61 For the first assumption, see Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 663
(1990); FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc, 479 US 238, 260 (1986). For the second, see
Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 235-37 (cited in note 8). See also notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
62 A point made in Grossberg, Comment, 42 U Chi L Rev at 157 (cited in note 8).
63 See Danny Hakim, On Wall St., More Investors Push Social Goals, NY Tunes Al (Feb
11, 2001); Susan Sherriek, A Conscience Doesn't Have to Make You Poor, Bus Wk 204 (May 1,
2000). The relevance of the development of these funds has been misunderstood. For example,
Joo, 79 wash U L Q at 61 & n 364 (cited in note 8), cites these funds as evidence that some inves-
tors have nonpecuniary goals, yet ignores the probability that this would motivate some manag-
ers to eschew political speech in order to tap into that source of capital. See id at 70-75.
64 Hakim, More Investors, NY Tunes at Al (cited in note 63).
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tions
.
e Since corporate soft-money donations were legal at the time of
these pledges, the behavior of these corporations belies the assump-
tion that without legal constraints all corporations would make politi-
cal donations.
Alternatively, take the distinction between incorporated non-
profit political associations and for-profit business corporations that
the Austin Court seized upon to justify exempting the former from
section 441b.6 According to the Court, shareholders or members of in-
corporated nonprofit political associations can easily dissociate them-
selves from the organization should they disagree with its political ac-
tivity. In contrast, because shareholders of business corporations are
"dependent" on the enterprise for income, there is an "economic dis-
incentive" to dissociating.6' But this analysis is backwards, for it is the
nonprofit political corporation's minority members who have a pow-
erful disincentive to dissociate. A profit-seeking investor's "economic
disincentive" to dissociating is nonsense. The minority shareholder
who invests in stock for income, which is the precondition to having an
economic disincentive to dissociating, is by hypothesis indifferent be-
tween companies with comparable rates of return. He therefore has
no reason not to sell his stock in the politically active company and
then invest the proceeds in another company that is not politically ac-
tive.6' In contrast, the minority shareholder or member of the incorpo-
rated nonprofit political association often faces an incentive not to
dissociate because of the shortage of alternatives. There is a thick
market for corporate securities; the menu of prospective political as-
sociations is less robust.6'
4. One-share/one-vote.
A third variation on the shareholder protection argument grows
out of the observation that "[v]oting in large publicly held corpora-
tions is by the share, not by the person."70 Thus, to borrow the words of
Professor Victor Brudney, "the political power of individuals with
large blocks of stock is magnified to the extent they can control, for
political purposes, the use of the assets of minority shareholders that
65 See note 47 and accompanying text.
66 494 US at 662-65 (distinguishing the Michigan Chamber of Commerce from an incorpo-
rated nonprofit political association). See also Beaumont v FEC, 278 F3d 261, 273-74 (4th Cir
2002); FEC v National Rifle Association of America, 254 F3d 173,188-92 (DC Cir 2001) (compar-
ing the National Rifle Association to an incorporated nonprofit political association).
67 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 US at 264.
68 See Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 137 (cited in note 8).
69 Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 74-75 (cited in note 8)
(discussing the difficulties a member of an ideological group faces in exiting, as opposed to the
shareholders in an corporation).
70 Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 258 (cited in note 8).
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are held in corporate solution."7 ' As a potential justification for section
441b, this is perhaps best thought of as a subtle expansion of the mi-
nority shareholder protection rationale just discussed. The traditional
understanding of the "minority" requiring protection is that it com-
prises those stockholders who disagree with the corporation's speech
but who collectively own too few shares to prevail in a proxy fight.
Because the usual rules of corporate elections call for voting in pro-
portion to the number of shares that one owns, this "minority" might
well represent a numerical majority (of owners, not shares) that, but
for the one-share/one-vote rule, would control. This argument thus
taps into the intuition that so far as politics are concerned, one-
person/one-vote is the only fair allocation of decisionmaking author-
ity.
But the objection to corporate political speech based on the tra-
ditional rule of one-share/one-vote misconceives the economic reali-
ties of corporate governance. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel have shown, in a system with voting rights that are not propor-
tional to the voter's stake in the enterprise, there will be a reduced in-
centive for voters to make optimal decisions, because the gains or
losses stemming from these decisions will not be internalized at a level
corresponding to the influence of one's vote. Therefore any rule other
than one-share/one-vote wastefully increases the agency costs associ-
ated with the corporate form.7
To be sure, this means that a single person, by virtue of a 51 per-
cent ownership stake in a corporation, will be able to control 100 per-
cent of the corporation's resources. And that, in turn, makes possible a
scenario in which this single person's voice will be made louder at the
expense of the perhaps thousands of minority shareholders.73 But this
hypothetical reveals this objection for what it really is: either a mere
restatement of the notion that minority shareholders (who here hap-
pen to constitute a numerical majority) need protection; an argument
that the majority stakeholder will misappropriate the minority's funds;
or an argument for doing something about the effects of an inegali-
tarian distribution of wealth.
As with the more straightforward protection of minority share-
holders argument explored above, only an irrational investor-or a ra-
tional investor who supported the majority shareholder's views-
would leave his money in such an arrangement without requiring a
discount to reflect this risk. Putting this particular spin on why minor-
ity shareholders require protection does nothing to advance the sub-
71 Id at 258 & n 83.
72 Easterbrook and Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J L & Econ at 405-09 (cited in
note 28).
73 See Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 258 (cited in note 8).
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stance of the argument. Similarly, the analysis above regarding the
simple agency problem of managers' potential misappropriation also
adequately replies to this more exotic misappropriation fear. Granted,
minority shareholders cannot "fire" a majority holder. But that prob-
lem is solved by (and perhaps helps explain) the fiduciary duties that
state corporate law imposes on dominant shareholders. In these cases
dominant shareholders are held to all the same fiduciary standards
that ordinarily apply to management.' Finally, if this argument is
merely a masked complaint about the distribution of wealth in society,
then the problem is not with the corporate form as much as it is with
the allocation of resources in a capitalist economy. And that does not
justify singling out incorporated firms while leaving individuals and
other business associations untouched.
5. Lowering the cost of capital.
The final twist on this line of argument is that section 441b lowers
the cost of capital.75 The argument takes the form of a syllogism begin-
ning with the premise that "most companies would 'bundle' the power
to make political and economic decisions. ' 6 So in the absence of a
proscription on contributions or at least a requirement of stockholder
consent, individuals looking to invest their money would have no
choice but to "relinquish full control of their resources for making po-
litical speech."' As a result, some people might be deterred from in-
vesting. This bundling of decisionmaking power would therefore be
"inefficient by conventional economic analysis" if the premium inves-
tors seek as compensation for their loss of political control out-
weighed the savings from avoiding the added transaction costs of a
corporation's having to raise money for its business and political en-
terprises independently.7'
The problem with this syllogism is its premise. Although manag-
ers as a class might hold a monopoly position in a loose sense, there is
74 See, for example, Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien, 280 A2d 717 (Del 1971); Zahn v Trans-
america Corp, 162 F2d 36 (3d Cir 1947); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.11 at 334 (1994); Cox, Hazen, and O'Neal, Corpora-
tions § 11.10 at 11.53 (cited in note 56) ("The basis for the controlling stockholder's fiduciary ob-
ligation is the sound policy that, just as directors are bound by certain fiduciary obligations, one
who has the potential to control the board's actions should be subject to an obligation as rigor-
ous as those applied to the directors.").
75 See Brudney, 91 Yale L J at 264-65 (cited in note 8) ("Allowing capital to be raised on
the condition that its contributors permit management to use it for political purposes, without
providing them a meaningful choice as to the particular political or noncommercial use, may in-
crease the cost of capital.").
76 Id at 270 (citation omitted).
77 Id.
78 Id at 264-65. See also Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 663,675-78 & n
8 (Brennan concurring).
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enormous competition within that class. This argument assumes, in ef-
fect, that managers, if not a cartel, will behave like one, the final result
of their conscious parallelism being that all managers will offer only
stock that bundles business with politics. But there are far too many
managers competing with each other in both the market for corporate
control and the capital market (in which, of course, managers compete
not only with each other but with nonstock alternatives as well) for
this to make any sense.7 If there are investors who are willing to make
their capital available at lower cost to managers who promise to for-
bear from political activity, then some managers would make that
promise in order to tap into that cheaper capital. After all, as noted
earlier, a number of high-profile corporations have announced a flat
policy against the giving of then-legal soft-money donations, and in-
vestment funds often cater to the idiosyncratic policy preferences of
investors.
At bottom, most of the conventional justifications for section
441b and its state analogues suppose investor irrationality and thus
are vulnerable on that ground. What is left, then, are the arguments
that it is inherently unfair that people with more money can spend
more on political speech and that the corporate form provides com-
petitive advantages in the market for legislation. Of these, the first is a
normative judgment for which the foregoing analysis can do little ex-
cept expose it as such. The second argument, however, is something to
which further analysis can speak.
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATING CORPORATE
POLITICAL SPEECH
This Part explores the political economy of the longstanding dis-
crimination against corporate political speech. Part II.A revisits the
question of rent seeking by corporations and explores its relationship
to the regulation of corporate political speech. Drawing on the tradi-
tional economic theory of regulation and the relevant collective action
dynamics, Part ll.B offers a partial explanation for why corporations
might favor discrimination against corporate political speech consis-
tent with the fact that the state-level regulation of corporate political
speech is located in state election rather than state corporate codes.
Part II.C briefly outlines the "new" economic theory of regulation,
79 See Meese, 2 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 309,338 (cited in note 8) (arguing that "[n]o firm
possesses economic power in capital markets sufficient to 'coerce' prospective shareholders into
accepting an unwanted bundling arrangement[,]" and that "[a]bsent a massive conspiracy among
major corporations, no firm has economic power over potential shareholders") (citation omit-
ted).
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most closely associated with Fred McChesney, and its relationship to
the traditional approach, often associated with George Stigler.m Fi-
nally, informed by the McChesney economic model of regulation, Part
II.D explores the underlying political economy of the 1907 Tllman
Act in light of a fresh look at the historical record.
A. Corporate Rent Seeking
The analysis above suggested that the corporate form might pro-
vide an especially effective vehicle for overcoming the collective ac-
tion and free rider problems that are the principal barriers to success
in the market for legislation.8' The idea was that incorporation cap-
tures in the form of stock the group's (shareholders') stake in the
leaders' (managers') lobbying efforts. Moreover, in contrast to the
costs of organizing a new group, for an already existing corporation
the fixed costs of organization are sunk.8 So the argument in favor of
the statutes is that they offset these advantages by raising the price to
corporations of rent seeking by making more cumbersome the meth-
ods through which regulation might be purchased." Taxes place a drag
on direct donations funneled through managers via an increased com-
pensation package, because managers will have to report that addi-
tional compensation as income. And because a candidate cannot in-
ternalize fully the benefits of a donation to her party (a "soft-money"
donation) as compared to a donation directly to her personal cam-
paign fund, she will require a larger donation before supporting legis-
lation favorable to the donor. Other indirect means are similarly more
costly. Therefore, because an increase in price leads to a decrease in
consumption (assuming some elasticity of demand), perhaps this
represents a social welfare justification for restricting corporate politi-
cal donations. On this view the statutes will reduce the total amount of
socially undesirable corporate lobbying for legislative rents.
Even if we assume that on balance corporate political activity is
socially undesirable, however, it is not clear that these statutes will
ameliorate that problem. For if in ascertaining price we consider not
only the size of the donation but also the cost to the corporation of
exposure to the risk of extortive threats-after all, there is no reason
to treat legislators and regulators as merely passive participants in the
market for legislation and regulation"A-then these statutes might ac-
80 See also Omri Yadlin, Commentary on Sitkoff, 69 U Chi L Rev 1167 (2002).
81 See Part I.A.2.
82 See note 39 and accompanying text.
83 Direct donations are the most straightforward form of support. See McChesney, Money
for Nothing at 46-50 (cited in note 13) ("The most obvious form of compensating legislators is to
give money to them personally or to their campaigns.").
84 "We all know that politicians need and actively seek out both votes and campaign
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tually reduce the cost of redistributive legislation. Just as a candidate
cannot fully internalize the benefits of a donation to her party that is
prompted by her promise to support legislation favorable to the do-
nor, she cannot fully internalize the benefits of a donation to her party
prompted by an extortive ultimatum. Similarly, the cumbersome
means of funneling a donation through a manager in the form of in-
creased compensation and the drag imposed by the tax consequences
of such an approach would provide an excuse for the inability to re-
spond swiftly and fully to an extortive ultimatum. Thus, if the net ef-
fect of these statutes is to make extortion more difficult, then these
laws might encourage rather than discourage undesirable participa-
tion in the market for legislation. This would be true if the value of the
statutes' extortion-protection function exceeds the increased price for
the legislation or regulation that is caused by its proscription on direct
donations.
B. Collective Action and the "Internal Affairs Doctrine"
One pro-corporation view of the statutes-a view both consistent
with the traditional economic theory of regulation and complemen-
tary to the extortion thesis advanced later in this Part-is that the
statutes represent a solution to the collective action problem faced by
the managers of a specific corporation if the redistributive lobbying by
corporations as a class, for the most part, victimized other corpora-
tions. For if corporate political activity represents both offensive and
defensive lobbying anent redistributive legislation, then corporations
as a class might do better with a flat ban on corporate campaign con-
tributions. Yet the managers of a single corporation could not risk act-
ing unilaterally.n From the perspective of well-diversified sharehold-
ers, moreover, wealth transfers between incorporated firms via legisla-
tive action represent nothing more than a deadweight loss in the
amount of the transfer costs, so shareholders might do better with a
total ban (unless the aggregate value of transfers from society at large
exceeds the transaction costs of the transfers between incorporated
firms)." On this view, the statutes solve the collective action problem
because they enforce concerted action. And indeed the statutes were
contributions; economists can hardly ignore, therefore, the possibility that politicians seek out, or
otherwise create, opportunities to use the legislative process in fulfillment of those needs" Doug-
las Ginsburg, A New Economic Theory of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation,
97 Mich L Rev 1771, 1773 (1999), reviewing McChesney, Money for Nothing (cited in note 13).
See also Part II.C.
85 See Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 76 (cited in note 8)
("All corporations might come out ahead if none participated in political activity. Yet individual
firms cannot afford to refuse to participate in the game, because they may lose more wealth
transfers to participating firms than they would save in rent-seeking costs.").
86 See text accompanying note 55.
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passed, as we shall see in a moment, in the wake of systematic assess-
ments in which political leaders took advantage of just this collective
action problem. Consider that solicitation letters often noted the
pledges of competitors.n
This collective action dynamic may also explain why on the state
level corporate political speech is regulated by state election rather
than state corporate codes. As noted above," had the regulations been
included in state corporate codes, then by operation of the internal af-
fairs doctrine they would regulate donations made anywhere by cor-
porations incorporated in that state. Instead, because they are located
in the election codes, these state laws govern the donations of all cor-
porations, regardless of their state of incorporation, with regard only
to elections in the state that enacted the given statute. Hence, the stat-
utes are responsive to the collective action problem on both ends-in
and out of state. With respect to in-state elections, they disarm all cor-
porations regardless of their state of incorporation. But with respect
to out-of-state elections, corporations incorporated in-state are not
unilaterally disarmed, so they are not placed at a disadvantage out-of-
state when competing for regulation in jurisdictions without a compa-
rable statute. Although inconsistent with the agency costs shareholder
protection rationale discussed earlier, the placement of these statutory
provisions in state election rather than state corporate codes is fully
consistent with the notion that these rules are beneficial to corpora-
tions. In light of the collective action dynamic identified here, this is a
reform that on the state level had to be enacted by and applied within
one state at a time."
C. The "New" Economic Theory of Regulation
The idea that the statutes solve a collective action problem is
premised on the notion that corporations as a class do better in a
world in which direct donations are prohibited. And indeed that might
be true given the deadweight transfer costs of simple firm-to-firm
wealth transfers. A richer account of why corporations as a class might
do better with a donation ban, however, may be developed by viewing
legislators as active participants in the market for legislation and con-
ceiving of the statutes as extortion-protection devices. Building on the
traditional economic theory of regulation, which assumed that there is
a demand and a supply for regulation in the same way that there is for
87 See notes 118, 210 and accompanying text. There is evidence that this collective action
problem has purchase in the analogous debate today over whether to ban soft money. See Part
IV.A.
88 See Part I.B.1.
89 Omri Yadlin helped me sort out the analysis of this paragraph.
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any other commodity,9 modern learning on the economic theory of
regulation posits a model that includes a more sophisticated concep-
tion of the behavior of individual legislators. This update to the eco-
nomic theory of regulation, most closely associated with Fred
McChesney,9' replaces the earlier conception of lawmakers as passive
suppliers of regulation to the highest bidders with a model in which
lawmakers are active participants who seek out opportunities to ex-
tract donations and other forms of support.
The model extends the [traditional] economic theory of regula-
tion to include the gains available to politician-maximizers from
alleviating costs threatened or actually imposed on private actors
by legislators themselves and by specialized bureaucratic agen-
cies. Status as a legislator confers a property right not only to
create political rents but also to impose costs that would destroy
private rents. In order to protect these returns, private owners
have an incentive to strike bargains with legislators, as long as the
side payments to politicians are lower than the losses expected
from the law threatened.9
It is in this light that we can better understand the political econ-
omy of the Tillman Act and its state law analogues, for it is in this light
that a fresh look at the historical record, both the legislative history
and contemporaneous news accounts, reveals a coherent story. The
story, as detailed in the next Part, is one of systematic shakedowns of
corporations at the turn of the century leading to the passage of the
Tiliman Act.u Thus, even if these laws facilitate rather than frustrate
efforts by large corporations to seek rents through redistributive legis-
lation (by reducing corporate exposure to extortive ultimatums), the
statutes may still be defended on the alternative ground that by pre-
venting extortion they preserve the socially desirable incentive for in-
novation. The statutes ensure that the increased profits which stem
90 Typified by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ &
Mgmt SCI 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ
211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 Q J Econ 371 (1983). See also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P Miller, Toward an In-
terest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex L Rev 469 (1987), which applies the
classical economic theory of regulation to explain Delaware's corporate law prominence.
91 See generally McChesney, Money for Nothing (cited in note 13); McChesney, 16 J Legal
Stud 101 (cited in note 13). See also McChesney, 6 Indep Rev 345 (cited in note 13).
92 McChesney, Money for Nothing at 41 (cited in note 13). See also Strauss, 94 Colum L
Rev at 1380-82 (cited in note 13); Strauss, 1995 U Chi Legal F at 152-55 (cited in note 13).
93 This view of the Tillman Act, as an anti-extortion device, is noted though not explored in
detail in Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 76 (cited in note 8), and
Ribstein, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev at 154-55 (cited in note 8).
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from that innovation flow to shareholders rather than elected offi-
cials. '
D. The Tillman Act
1. Political entrepreneurship."
The passage of the 1907 Tillman Act (and its state law ana-
logues9) is usually explained as a product of political entrepreneurship
by opportunistic politicians who capitalized on the Progressive Era's
distrust of large corporations generally and a few salient corporate
campaign finance scandals in particular."" As one commentator ex-
pressed it, "To save democracy from oligarchic capital, electoral re-
formers organized to 'purify the politics' of American government."9'
Certainly the idea that political entrepreneurship played a role in
the passage of the Tillman Act finds support in the historical record.
The presidential election of 1904, in particular, was marked by numer-
ous appeals to voters in which the candidates spoke of the evils stem-
ming from the "corruptive" influence of large corporations.99 Accord-
94 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 32-34 (cited in note 13).
95 On political entrepreneurs, see, for example, William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federal-
ism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 Fordham L Rev 57,129-31 (1999); Daniel A.
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J L, Econ, & Org 59,65-70 (1992).
96 Most of the comparable state statutes are of a similar historical pedigree. See Sikes, State
and Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation at 279-83 (cited in note 4) (listing states that prohib-
ited corporate contributions near the turn of the century).
97 See, for example, George Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree?: American Campaign Fi-
nancing Practices from 1789 to the Present 53-54 (Simon & Schuster 1973) (summarizing a few of
the reasons for the passage of the T'ilman Act); Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech- The Folly of
Campaign Finance Reform 23-24 (Princeton 2001) (citing a New York legislative investigation
into insurance companies' large donations to national politicians as an important factor in lead-
ing to the passage of the Tflman Act); Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political Cam-
paigns at 11-12 (cited in note 8) (arguing that "[t]he presidential election of 1904 was the catalyst
that brought about the federal legislation regulating corporate campaign contributions" and ex-
plaining congressional action in enacting the T'ilman Act); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-
Practices Legislation at 188-92 (cited in note 4) (recounting corporations' contributions and ac-
tive support of the Republican Party in the election of 1896, President Theodore Roosevelt's dis-
dain for these actions, and Congress's passage of the Tllman Act); Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev
at 1246-47 (cited in note 8) ("The Tillman Act was justified by many on equality grounds to re-
strict the corrupting influence of corporations in politics."); Mutch, Campaigns; Congress, and the
Courts 1-8 (cited in note 5) (citing corporations' contributions to the Republican Party during
the 1904 presidential campaign as the reason for Congress's passage of the Tillman Act). The na-
tional market for corporate charters was at the time just beginning, which aggravated the already
poor public estimation of large corporations. See Liggett Co v Lee, 288 US 517, 567 (1933)
(Brandeis dissenting) (criticizing this development and the "Frankenstein monster" corporation
it engendered); Butler and Ribstein, The Corporation and the Constitution at 72 (cited in note 8)
(mentioning that corporate speech restrictions arose "in the early part of the twentieth century,
during a time of general distrust of large institutions that fueled the Populist and Progressive
movements").
98 Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1246 (cited in note 8).
99 See Mutch, Campaigns; Congress, and the Courts at 1-2 (cited in note 5) (explaining how
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ing to contemporaneous media accounts, "the collection and accep-
tance of contributions from Trusts and corporations [was] the domi-
nant issue of the campaign,"No and in the wake of the 1904 election,
charges of improper fundraising abounded. °' Many specifically criti-
cized President Roosevelt for appointing a former cabinet Secretary
as chairman of the Republican National Convention.c This criticism
prompted Roosevelt to call for election reform in his 1905 message to
Congress,n and that message has since been credited with having set
in motion the enactment of the 1907 Tillman Act."" For although Sena-
tor William E. Chandler had introduced a similar measure in 1901, it
was only when the issue achieved popular salience after the 1904 elec-
Democrats and Republicans accused each other of unethically accepting significant contribu-
tions from corporations); Bolton, 22 Ariz L Rev at 377 & n 18 (cited in note 8) (describing the
outrage of 1904 presidential candidate Alton B. Parker and Congress at the excessive corporate
contributions to political candidates).
100 The Dominant Issue- "Buying the President", NY Tunes 8 (Nov 7,1904). Commentators
have since agreed. See James K. Pollock, Jr., Party Campaign Funds 9 (Knopf 1926) (recounting
how the Democratic candidate for the presidency during the 1904 election, Judge Alton B.
Parker, "charged that corporations were supplying funds for the Republican campaign in order
to buy influence with the Administration").
101 See Epstein, Corporations; Contributions, and Political Campaigns at 11-12 (cited in
note 8) (discussing the accusations of improper corporate contributions to political parties heard
by Congress). Contemporaneous examples include Thunder of Cheers Greets Judge Parker, NY
Times 1 (Nov 1, 1904); Judge Parker's Great Service to the Country, NY Tunes 8 (Nov 7, 1904);
Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Tunes 2 (Dee 3,1905); To Bar Corporation Cash
in Campaigns, NY Tunes 1 (Jan 22, 1907); 41 Cong Rec H 1452 (Jan 21, 1907) (Representative
Robinson) ("[1It is an undisputed fact to-day that some of the great corporations of this country,
in order to corrupt the electorates of this Republic, took from their treasuries in the last national
campaign many thousands of dollars.").
102 See, for example, Buying the President, NY Tunes 8 (Oct 1,1904) (arguing that President
Roosevelt's appointment of a former cabinet secretary was "scandalous"). This charge is ex-
plored more fully below. See notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
103 President's Annual Message, 40 Cong Rec S at 96 (cited in note 45) (quoting President
Roosevelt's 1905 message to Congress and his call for federal election campaign contribution re-
form). See Mutch, Campaigns; Congress; and the Courts at 3-4 (cited in note 5) (discussing Presi-
dent Roosevelt's meeting with advisors about the issue of corporate contributions to election
campaigns and his ultimate decision to call for election reform).
104 Mutch, Campaigns; Congress; and the Courts at 4 (cited in note 5) ("President Roose-
velt's 1905 message to Congress is generally regarded as having initiated the series of actions
ending in the 1907 enactment of a prohibition on corporate political contributions"); Sikes, State
and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 190-91 (cited in note 4) (mentioning that shortly af-
ter President Roosevelt addressed Congress about his proposals for election reform, Congress
enacted a statute reflecting his proposals). When introducing the bill only two months after the
speech, Contributions by Corporations in Political Campaigns, 59th Cong, 1st Sess, in 40 Cong
Rec S 2642 (Feb 19, 1906), Tillman quoted "copiously from the president's message." Mutch,
Campaign; Congress; and the Courts at 6 (cited in note 5). And in the debates in the House the
following year, Roosevelt's remarks were referred to on several occasions. See, for example, 41
Cong Rec H at 1452 (Representative Rucker) (cited in note 101) (noting that reform was
"strongly indorsed by the President ... in his annual message"); id at 1453 (Representative
Hardwick) ("The President of the United States ... has himself recommended its passage in his
message to the Congress").
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tion scandals that the proposal got anywhere."' Two months after
Roosevelt's speech, Senator Benjamin R. "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, for
whom the 1907 Act is named, seized on Chandler's initiative and as-
sumed sponsorship of the legislation. Tillman did so because it would
cause "some uneasiness" for various Republican legislators while at
the same time would attract public attention to him and give him a
measure of control over the new Congress's legislative agenda.'O Thus,
"In the election year 1906, Republicans might have allowed the bill to
expire quietly in committee had not Tillman kept the issue alive with
his resolution. '
When one adds the supposition that labor probably supported
the Tillman Act in order to lessen the influence of capital, the Act's
lineage seems to come together. Certainly cabining the ability of man-
agement to purchase legislation would be advantageous to labor. But
for one mediocre and one compelling reason this simple account of
the enactment of the Tillman Act, without more, is not satisfactory.
First, in the 1940s the Tillman Act was amended to apply with equal
force to unions.'° Yet if labor had been the driving force behind limit-
ing corporate political speech, and if the Tillman Act had truly less-
ened corporate influence, we would have expected corporate limits to
be ratcheted up, not the subsequent establishment of limitations on
unions.' And anyway, at the time of the Tillman Act's passage, labor
for the most part had not yet organized.o
105 See Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 4-6 (cited in note 5) (describing how
the press ignored Chandler's proposal until after the 1904 election campaign finance scandals
and the New York Armstrong Committee investigation).
106 Id at 5-6 (explaining Senator Tilman's efforts to keep his bill for election reform alive).
See 40 Cong Rec S at 2642 (cited in note 104) (quoting congressional debate on the proposed
Tillman Act). See generally Wendy J. Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill
Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas, 39 Am J Polit Sci 186 (1995) (analyzing the conditions
under which senators will sponsor legislation).
107 Mutch, Campaigns, Congress; and the Courts at 6 (cited in note 5) ("Tillman's persistence
might have been intended to keep his bill in the public eye.").
108 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Taft-Hartley Act"), Pub L No 100, 61 Stat
136, 159, codified at 29 USC §§ 151-66 (1947). See also United States v International Union
Automobile Workers, 352 US 567, 582-83 (1956) (noting that the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 was amended to apply also to unions). See Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and
Political Campaigns at 13-14 (cited in note 8) (noting that Congress restricted union campaign
contributions in § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); Comment, The Regula-
tion of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U Pa L Rev 386,
393-94 (1977) (same); Larry J. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Commit-
tees 5-6 (Norton 1984) (same).
109 The fact that the historical record contains strong evidence that unions opposed the later
extension of the statute to cover them, see William S. White, Veto Tactic Delays Senate Labor
Vote: Foes Assail Bill to Set Case for Rejection- Tell Truman Signing Means '48 Defeat, NY Tunes
1 (June 6, 1947) (noting union demonstrations against the provision); Joseph A. Loftus, AFL
Calls Illegal Two Points in Law: Will Advise Unions to Violate Ban on Political Spending and Red
Disclaimer, NY 'imes 1 (June 29, 1947) ("American Federation of Labor lawyers put their fin-
gers today on at least two provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law which they regard as so clearly un-
[69:11031130
2002] Competition for Corporate Charters
Second, and this is the more compelling argument against the no-
tion that political entrepreneurship satisfactorily explains the Tillman
Act, there is an alternative though somewhat complementary political
economy story that is equally if not more consistent with the historical
record-a record that is devoid of clear evidence of strong opposition
by corporations. This complementary explanation is also consistent
with modern learning on the economic theory of regulation. Simply
put, corporations probably supported the enactment of the Tillman
Act as a means of protecting themselves from extortive threats by po-
litical leaders seeking campaign contributions.
2. Political extortion.
To begin with, the Tllman Act should be placed in its specific
campaign finance historical context. The public controversy regarding
the role of corporate money in the 1904 election, to which we shall re-
turn more comprehensively shortly, represented the natural escalation
of a process begun in the campaigns of the late 1800s.'" For it was in
the elections of the late 1880s and the 1890s that the national parties
began shouldering a larger share of the burden. 2 This meant that the
then "customary method of voluntary contribution, helped out by a
constitutional that they will advise their unions to violate them."); Louis Stark, Unions Widen At-
tacks on Taft-Hartley Law: Defiance of Ban against Political Funds Is Now Major Challenge, NY
Tunes B7 (Aug 17,1947) (detailing the challenges unions mounted against the Taft-Hartley Act),
does not undercut the contention that corporations supported or at least did not seriously op-
pose the 1907 enactment. First, that there is compelling evidence of union opposition to this ex-
tension bolsters the inference that there was no similar systematic corporate opposition to the
1907 enactment, because there is a lack of comparable good evidence of opposition by corpora-
tions to the original 1907 enactment. Second, the extension of the Act to unions came in the
wake of a similar provision in the 1943 War Labor Disputes Act ("Smith-Connally Act"), 57 Stat
163, 167-68 (prohibiting political contributions by labor organizations), repealed by 62 Stat 683,
862 (1948), rather than, as explored below, in the wake of massive "assessments" by political
leaders. Third, as a practical matter, it would be more difficult for unions to evade the limitation
by funneling donations through union leaders in the form of increased compensation, because
the practical ceiling on union leader compensation is lower than that on corporate executive
compensation.
110 Lambert, 40 NYU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 8) (explaining that "during the latter part
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth[,J [l]abor was still largely unorgan-
ized").
111 See Smith, Unfree Speech at 21-22 (cited in note 97); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-
Practices Legislation at 188-89 (cited in note 4); Epstein, Corporations, Contributions; and Politi-
cal Campaigns at 10-11 (cited in note 8); Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money". Corporate
Contribution Bans and the Separation of Ownership and Control 11-13, working paper (2001)
(on file with author).
112 See Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 188 (cited in note 4); Tho-
mas E. Felt, The Rise of Mark Hanna 342, unpublished Michigan State University Ph.D. disserta-
tion (1961); Fred C. Shoemaker, Mark Hanna and the Transformation of the Republican Party
209, unpublished Ohio State University Ph.D. dissertation (1992). See also Shoemaker, Mark
Hanna and the Transformation of the Republican Party at 226; Thayer, Who Shakes the Money
Tree at 48 (cited in note 97).
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little dunning of the protected manufacturers, was wholly insuffi-
cient. '" '3 So the national political parties for the first time deployed
sophisticated and systematic procedures for demanding contributions
for their candidates from corporations in particular. Not coinciden-
tally, this occurred soon after the Pendleton Act of 1883 banned con-
tributions, often extorted, from civil servants. 1
In the 1896 election, the first of two in which William McKinley
defeated William Jennings Bryan, the dominant issue was monetary
policy. So Mark Hanna, the Republican party leader who was ulti-
mately responsible for raising money for McKinley, focused his fund-
raising efforts on New York financiers and large corporations." Stan-
dard Oil was taxed, as it were, $250,000, and under Hanna's steward-
ship the Republican National Committee assessed banks at one-
quarter of one percent of their capital.16 As his biographer put it,
Hanna "did his best to convert the practice from a matter of political
begging on the one side and donating on the other into a matter of
systematic assessment according to the means of the individual and
institution." 7 No doubt designed to take advantage of the collective
113 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work 213-19 (Macmillan 1912). See
also Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 188-89 (cited in note 4); Thayer,
Who Shakes the Money Tree at 49 (cited in note 97).
114 See Smith, Unfree Speech at 20 (cited in note 97) (observing that the Pendleton Act,
which limited "the ability of officeholders to extract contributions from those they appointed to
office," is often considered to have been the first campaign finance law); Thayer, Who Shakes the
Money Tree at 38-40 (cited in note 97) ("Business became a prime source of campaign funds af-
ter the passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883, a law that banned contributions from civil ser-
vants.").
115 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 219-20 (cited in note 113); Sikes, State and Federal Cor-
rupt-Practices Legislation at 189 (cited in note 4) ("Hanna converted the practice of soliciting
contributions from a matter of political beginning into a matter of systematic assessment accord-
ing to the means of the individual and institution.... Standard Oil Company contributed
$250,000 to be used by Mr. Hanna in the campaign."). See also Clarence A. Stem, Resurgent Re-
publicanism: The Handiwork of Hanna 25-26 (Edwards Brothers 1963) ("[Hanna] overcame the
initial reluctance of Wall Street financiers to making generous campaign contributions, and he
gave the major portion of his time to the collection of funds in New York."); Felt, Rise of Mark
Hanna at 342-46 (cited in note 112); Smith, Unfree Speech at 22 (cited in note 97) ("Hanna me-
thodically 'assessed' the nation's leading businesses for campaign cash.").
116 Winkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1247 (cited in note 8) (noting that Standard Oil "was
required to contribute $250,000 to the 1896 Republican presidential campaign"); Thayer, Who
Shakes the Money Tree at 50 (cited in note 97) ("Banks ... were assessed one quarter of one per-
cent of their capital; Standard Oil contributed about a quarter of a million dollars, and large in-
surance companies slightly less."); Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220 (cited in note 113) (stat-
ing that Standard Oil Company gave $250,000, and that the Republican National Committee as-
sessed banks at a rate "of one-quarter of one per cent of their capital"). See also Lambert, 40
NYU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 8) ("Hanna supervised the collection and expenditure of per-
haps as much as $16 million, an enormous sum for [1896], by systemizing contributions from the
business community, particularly the larger corporations."); Felt, The Rise of Mark Hanna at 347
(cited in note 112).
117 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220, 222 (cited in note 113). See also Thayer, Who
Shakes the Money Tree at 49 (cited in note 97) ("But he did systematize the collection of funds
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action problem facing those being leaned on, solicitation letters often
included the names of competitors who had made pledges and the
amounts of those pledges.18 Party affiliation did not matter; members
of both parties were simply assessed their shares by Hanna and his
staff'1 9
In this extortion-colored light, consider the remark of Represen-
tative Williams during the House debate on its version of the Tillman
Act with respect to a donation by Democratic managers of New York
Life to a Republican campaign: the episode, said Williams, represented
"all the more sad a commentary, because it shows that even Democ-
rats, when identified with great corporations, are compelled to con-
tribute Democratic money to Republican campaign funds in order to
expect justice from a Republican Administration."'' With this com-
ment Williams articulated precisely the change in the turn-of-the-
century forms of campaign finance. Indeed, for McKinley's 1900 re-
election campaign, Hanna "further [ ] systematize[d] the work of col-
lection, '',l and "[w]ith his customary efficiency, Hanna shook down the
business world for $2.5 million."' ' Contribution levels were assessed
by party leaders, and contributions above and below these assess-
ments were returned!"3
Returning now to the 1904 election controversy, in which, as
noted earlier, charges of improper fundraising abounded-which
charges prompted Roosevelt's 1905 call for reform and ultimately the
1907 Act-it is worth considering the specific content of those allega-
tions. Many of the complaints charged in particular that it was im-
and, for better or for worse, raised the level of the entire financial operation of campaigns out of
the trough of blackmail and bribery."); Felt, Rise of Mark Hanna at 370 (cited in note 112) ("He
had raised and spent unprecedented campaign funds, not merely by discreet begging but by sys-
tematic demands on banks and other businesses benefited by his candidate's tariff and currency
policies!'). Croly had access to Hanna's private papers, which have since been destroyed. Thus
the Croly biography, which is said to "sketch[ ] a full portrait of Hanna's public and private life,"
is regarded as "the single best authority of Hanna's private life, including many of his private and
political arrangements." Shoemaker, Mark Hanna at 5 (cited in note 112).
118 Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at 189-90 (cited in note 4) (de-
scribing the campaign letters the National Bankers' Association sent to all its bankers in light of
the political campaign of 1896).
119 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 220, 222 (cited in note 113) ("[A]ppeals were made to
banks and business men, irrespective of party affiliations.").
120 41 Cong Ree H at 1454 (cited in note 101).
121 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 325 (cited in note 113); Felt, The Rise of Mark Hanna at
351-52 (cited in note 112).
122 Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 51 (cited in note 97).
123 Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna at 325 (cited in note 113) ("In case an exceptionally opu-
lent corporation or business firm contributed decidedly less than was considered its fair propor-
tion, the checque might be returned.... On the other hand, an excessively liberal subscription
might also be sent back in part."). See also Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree at 50 (cited in
note 97) ("If a company sent in a check Hanna believed to be too small, it was returned; if a
company paid too much, a refund was sent out.").
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proper for Roosevelt to have appointed former Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor George Cortelyou to head the Republican National
Committee,4 because the Department of Commerce and Labor's Bu-
reau of Corporations had the authority to investigate corporations do-
ing interstate business. Thus, The New York Times alleged wrongdoing
"when the chief of the Department which has become the custodian
of corporation secrets is put at the head of the partisan committee
whose principal function is to collect campaign contributions which
come chiefly from great corporations. Although there was no proof
of actual wrongdoing by Cortelyou, the commonly held belief was that
in a typical fundraising visit,
Chairman Cortelyou goes to one of the officers of a large corpo-
ration and informs him that the Republican National Committee
expects a substantial contribution from his company. The officer
in question is surprised; he is not of Mr. Roosevelt's party, neither
he nor his corporation has been accustomed to meddle with poli-
tics; he asks for time to think it over. In the solitude of his office
his thoughts run in this wise: I do not want to give money to the
Republican National Committee. But I am trustee of the inter-
ests of the stockholders of this corporation. I may soon have to
appear before this man as a representative of my corporation in a
matter affecting its business, as to which he will have, if not offi-
cial discretion, at least very great personal and official influence,
which I would dislike to have used against me. I cannot let my
personal disinclinations stand in the way of the company's inter-
ests. I will make this forced contribution to Mr. Cortelyou's
fund.u
This hypothetical account does not appear to be hyperbolic. In
September of 1905, for example, it was reported that during a Bureau
124 It was also thought to be improper for Cortelyou to have been rewarded with a plum
political appointment afterward. See 41 Cong Rec H at 1453 (cited in note 101) (Representative
Robinson) (in the House debate on the Tillman Act, referring to the "fact that the chairman of
the last national Republican committee who received these funds has been promoted in office").
Cortelyou was made Secretary of the Treasury.
125 Buying the President, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 102). See also Publicity for National
and State Campaign Funds, 49 Harper's Weekly 1767 (Nov 25, 1905) ("It is not certain that Mr.
Cortelyou, by accepting and using the contributions of the corporations referred to, made him-
self a party to an embezzlement, or, in other words, to the diversion of funds whereof the pre-
tended donors were only trustees, without the consent of the real owners."); Thunder of Cheers
Greets Judge Parker, NY Tunes at 1 (cited in note 101); Judge Parker's Great Serice to the Coun-
try, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 101); Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Tunes at 2
(cited in note 101); To Bar Corporation Cash in Campaigns, NY Times 1 (June 22, 1907) (refer-
ring to an allegation of "Cortelyou's holding up various corporations").
126 Id. See also Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Times at 2 (cited in note
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of Corporations investigation into certain Chicago packing companies,
"a demand was made upon them for $5 0 ,0 00.' '"7
The reports of the time, moreover, are replete in particular with
interventions by insurance companies, to the tune of tens of thousands
of dollars,n which is similarly consistent with an extortion story. Be-
cause they are subject to so much governmental oversight, insurance
companies are especially vulnerable to extortive threats. Thus it
should come as no surprise that many of the turn-of-the-century alle-
gations of extortion and other election funding improprieties as re-
ported in both contemporaneous news accounts and a high-profile
1905 New York legislative investigation involved insurance compa-
nies.'" These various insurance scandals figure significantly in the
legislative history of the Tillman Act,o and the investigation gave sali-
ence to the issue. 
3
1
On this view the exorbitant corporate campaign contributions of
the late 1800s and early 1900s did represent inefficient redistribu-
tion-only the rents were being had by politicians at the expense of
shareholders. This is not to say that these corporations were not en-
gaged in socially undesirable rent seeking. Rather, the point is that
legislators, as sellers, play as active a role in the market for legislation
as potential buyers such as corporations. To the extent that they will
therefore actively raise funds through threats and other means, acqui-
escing in a ban on direct corporate contributions would be a rational
corporate response.
127 Cash from the Packers: Story of a Republican Demand While the Beef Inquiry Was On,
NY Times 2 (Sept 17,1905).
128 Parker on Corporate Corruption of Parties, NY Tunes 1 (Sept 18,1905) (discussing New
York Life's $50,000 contribution). See also Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 2
(cited in note 5) ("The political power wielded by insurance companies in New York State, par-
ticularly by the 'big three' of New York, Mutual, and Equitable Life, had been the subject of ru-
mor and suspicion for decades before the appointment of a joint state legislative committee to
investigate the industry in 1905.").
129 For more on the Armstrong Committee investigation, see Mutch, Campaigns, Congress;
and the Courts at 2-3 (cited in note 5); Sikes, State and Federal Corrupt-Practices Legislation at
108-10 (cited in note 4) (discussing evidence uncovered by the Armstrong Committee). For news
accounts, see, for example, Parkers Friends Asked for Money, NY Times 1 (Sept 21,1905) (stating
that the president of a New York insurance company declared on the stand during the Arm-
strong Committee investigation "that the Democratic candidates, including ex-Judge Parker and
the Chairman of the Democratic National and State Committees, were 'chasing' him for money
in last Fall's campaign."); Demand for Cortelyou in Insurance Inquiry, NY Times at 2 (cited in
note 101); Mr. Perkins's Position, NY Tunes 8 (Mar 9, 1907) (condemning the Republican Na-
tional Committee for taking excessive corporate contributions).
130 See, for example, 41 Cong Rec H at 1451-55 (cited in note 101) (recounting House de-
bate on the Tillman Act, which contains numerous references to the contributions).
131 See WVinkler, "Other People's Money" at 16-24 (cited in note 111). Winkler argues that it
was the Armstrong Committee hearings that prompted the enactment of these statutes and that
the statutes' primary motivation was the protection of shareholders.
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Not surprisingly, corporate leaders embraced the Tillman Act for
precisely that reason. As a Republican State Committee member ob-
served of corporate leaders: They are "entranced with happiness....
[T]hey are now in a position to toe us unceremoniously out of the
door if we ask them for a penny .... They mean to take advantage of
the laws forbidding them to give money for political purposes."'' In-
deed, consider this reaction of a "great financial authority" to the Sen-
ate's passage of the statute,33 which was reported in an editorial enti-
tled Happy Corporations: "[We] welcome [ ] this legislation with very
much the same emotions with which a serf would his liberation from a
tyrannous autocrat."' '
In this extortion-colored light, moreover, not only do these re-
ported responses of corporate leaders to the statute's passage make
sense, but so does the statute's limited scope. The Tillman Act left in-
tact donations other than direct contributions or independent expen-
ditures on behalf of specific candidates, and thus the Act would not
touch donations funneled through managers in the form of increased
compensation. '35 This porousness was not an oversight. Congress re-
jected more restrictive proposals ' ' even though the porousness of the
Tillman Act's proscriptions was widely known at the time of its en-
132 Happy Corporations, NY Times 8 (June 17,1906).
133 40 Cong Rec S 8163 (June 9, 1906) (reporting the passage of the Tillman Act). For con-
temporaneous coverage, see Election Funds Will Suffer, NY Times 3 (June 10, 1906) (reporting
that the Senate passed a bill prohibiting money gifts by corporations to election campaigns). After
the midterm elections Representative Joseph Gaines introduced, the legislation in the House. 41
Cong Rec H at 1451 (Representative Gaines) (cited in note 101) (introducing legislation "to pro-
hibit corporations from making money contributions in connection with political elections").
134 Happy Corporations, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 132).
135 Details and examples are given in Epstein, Corporations, Contributions, and Political
Campaigns at 59-78 (cited in note 8). See also 93 Cong Ree S 1604 (June 6, 1947) (Senator
Kilgore) ("Every one knows the way they get around the prohibition against corporate contribu-
tions, by simply declaring bonuses to certain officials, which can be used for political purposes.");
93 Cong Rec H 3522 (Apr 16, 1947) (Representative Miller) (detailing specific examples); Sa-
bato, PAC Power at 4 (cited in note 108). See also Smith, Unfree Speech at 24 (cited in note 97)
("Although the Tillman Act may have reduced corporate participation in politics it hardly served
to eliminate it" because some managers "made large personal contributions with the knowledge
that they would be reimbursed by their corporate employers.").
136 "The 1909 Congress witnessed unsuccessful attempts to amend the [Tillman] Act to pro-
scribe the contribution of anything of value and to extend its application to the election of state
legislatures." United States v International Union Automobile Workers, 352 US 567, 575 (1956).
See 42 Cong Rec H 696-703 (Jan 14,1908) (recounting the congressional debate about extending
the application of the Tillman Act to the election of state legislatures and proscribing corporate
contributions of anything of value and the congressional opposition to these proposed amend-
ments); 44 Cong Rec H 4595 (July 23, 1909) (reporting the congressional debate about amending
the Tillman Act to prohibit "Congress and the courts from receiving valuable gifts, employment,
or compensation of any kind from public-service corporations, trusts, and persons engaged in in-
terstate commerce, or having an interest in legislation" and the tabling of that debate and, thus,
that proposed amendment). See also Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts at 8-16 (cited
in note 5) (giving an account of congressional opposition to proposed amendments that would
increase the reach of the Tillman Act).
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actment,n and even though the 1905 presidential message to Congress
that had set in motion the passage of the Act called for a total ban on
donations by corporations "for any political purpose."'33 Thus, after the
Tillman Act's enactment, corporations could still purchase legislation
through many remaining indirect means, albeit at a higher price. But
the cumbersomeness and increased costs of the remaining methods-
consider the tax consequences and time delay of funneling a donation
through managers as increased compensation-would provide an ex-
cuse for the inability to respond swiftly and fully to an extortive ulti-
matum. True, "soft-money" donations are relatively easy to make and
were not covered by the statute. But this fact does not undercut the
foregoing analysis of the statute's enactment and durability as theS 131
soft-money donation was largely unknown until 1988. Indeed, as will
be explored in greater detail below," a similar confluence of factors-
the innovation of a new fundraising technique followed several elec-
tion cycles later by rampant corporate donations, political entrepre-
neurship, and anecdotal evidence of extortion-may be found in the
current debate over banning soft-money donations.
Returning to 1907, the point that the limited scope of the statute
would allow corporations to continue to purchase desired legislation
137 See, for example, 41 Cong Rec H at 1454 (Representative Grosvenor) (cited in note 101)
("[The Tillman Act] does not go far enough. If you want to purify the politics of this country by
an assurance that there shall be no corrupting of the voters at the polls, you must go further than
to suppress national corporations."); Tribute from Corporations, NY Times 2 (Aug 19, 1908);
Happy Corporations, NY Tunes at 8 (cited in note 132) (explaining that the Tillman Act was po-
rous because it was foreseeable that corporations that were restricted from donating to national
political campaigns would contribute to state political campaigns). See also 66 Cong Rec H 3664
(Feb 13,1925) (criticizing the current election law of 1925 because "reports [were] made by po-
litical committees just before and immediately after elections. The public [had] no knowledge of
contributions made in the meantime."); 41 Cong Ree H at 1452 (Representative Robinson)
(cited in note 101) (arguing that the Tillman Act "does not go far enough.ve ought to include all
corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and we ought also to provide an effective means
for discovering violations of the law and for the enforcement of its provisions."). Compare 89
Cong Rec S 5781 (June 12,1943) (Senator Bone) (objecting to subjecting certain corporations to
more regulatory restrictions). See also Wimkler, 32 Loyola LA L Rev at 1251-52 (cited in note 8)
("Many legislators who supported the corporate contribution ban in 1907 would not be surprised
by the law's ineffectiveness."); Epstein, Corporations Contributions and Political Campaigns at
59-60 (cited in note 8) (noting that "the inherent limitations of [campaign election contribution
reform] legislation were recognized shortly after the Tillman Act of 1907 was passed"); note 135.
138 President's Annual Message, 40 Cong Rec S at 96 (cited in note 45).
139 See Alison Mitchell, Fearing Limits on Soft Money, Parties Fill Coffers, NY Tunes Al,
A16 (Feb 11, 2002) ("[In 1988, the parties began taking soft money donations."); Jill Abramson,
The Hard Business of Soft Money, NY Tunes § 4 at 3 (Mar 26,2000) (discussing the fundraisers
behind the start of soft-money contributions in 1988); Christine Gorman, The Price of Power,
Tune 44 (Oct 31,1988) (recounting how the Dukakis-Bush presidential race marked the begin-
ning of soft-money fundraising); Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, Investing in the People's Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Fi-
nance Reform 23-25 (CED 1999) (detailing the origins and growth of soft-money fundraising).
140 See Part N.A.
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(in the Stigler model) while reducing exposure to extortive ultima-
tums (in the McChesney model) did not go unnoticed by contempo-
rary observers. Consider the analysis of the Times upon the Act's pas-
sage in the Senate:
[The Act] will lessen a very mean and sordid practice of black-
mail. The beneficiaries of [regulation] will still find methods of
furnishing the sinews of war to the party that controls their fa-
vors, but the great number of corporations that have suffered ex-
tortion through weakness and cowardice will have their back-
bones stiffened, and parties will be put to it to fill their coffers by
really voluntary contributions. I"
To the extortion thesis one might reply that it does not provide a
total explanation for the Tillman Act's enactment. Admittedly there
must have been some political entrepreneurship at work, and this is
consistent with the evidence adduced in Part II.D.1. Indeed, accepting
a role for political entrepreneurship is necessary to explain why legis-
lators, who had been the principal beneficiaries of the rent extraction
discussed above, did in fact enact the Tillman Act. Senator Tillman and
the Act's other supporters capitalized on the political opportunity cre-
ated by the level of political extortion having reached something of a
popular "outrage constraint"' 2 after the presidential election of 1904.
Still, the anti-extortion account does fill some important gaps in the
traditional political entrepreneurship view. Most notably, the extortion
thesis helps explain the porousness of these laws. It is one thing for
corporate leaders to acquiesce in the closing of the most obvious ave-
nues of political extortion in the wake of systematic assessments and
rampant political interventions. It would have been quite another to
expect them to stand by if the statutes would have closed corporations
off from the market for legislation entirely.
The foregoing analysis of the political economy of the longstand-
ing discrimination against corporate political speech suggests that de-
spite the incoherence of most of the conventional justifications for
section 441b and its state counterparts, these statutes may well be
grounded in sound policy concerns. As Fred McChesney has ex-
plained, "Even if politicians eventually allow themselves to be bought
off, their minatory presence reduces the expected value of entrepre-
141 Happy Corporations, NY Times at 8 (cited in note 132).
142 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, Managerial Power
and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U Chi L Rev 751 (2002).
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neurial ability and specific-capital investments."4 3 This, however, raises
a new question: if the statutes do indeed serve a function that is con-
sistent with maximizing shareholder welfare, what is the pertinence of
Delaware's not having one?
HI. CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH AND DELAWARE
This Part explores the relevance of the state law analogues of sec-
tion 441b-and the fact that Delaware is among the minority of states
that does not discriminate against corporate political speech'"-for
the debate over the wisdom of corporate law federalism. Although
section 441b applies to all state-chartered corporations, regardless of
their state of incorporation, it does so only with regard to their par-
ticipation in federal elections.'4 The participation of state-chartered
corporations in state elections is regulated only by the local election
law of the relevant state. Thus, even though the law of the state in
which the donation is made rather than the law of the state in which
the corporation is chartered governs the legality of state-level corpo-
rate donations, ' state election law may nonetheless have an effect on
the decision where to incorporate. The local regulation of corporate
political speech is a relevant consideration in reckoning the respon-
siveness of local legislators to corporate needs.
Part IlI.A outlines the history of the perennial debate over cor-
porate regulatory competition and situates the analysis of this Article
within that debate. Part III.B then assimilates into the corporate regu-
latory competition debate the McChesney economic model of regula-
tion as applied in this Article to the question of corporate political
speech. More specifically, Part Ill.B contends that the political econ-
omy of the ongoing discrimination against corporate political speech
and the plausible public interest justifications for that discrimination
offered above are consistent with Delaware's not discriminating
143 McChesney, Money for Nothing at 33 (cited in note 13).
144 See note 169.
145 2 USC § 441b:
It is unlawful ... for any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Sena-
tor or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be
voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held
to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political commit-
tee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this sec-
tion, or any officer or any director of any corporation ... to consent to any contribution or
expenditure by the corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be,
prohibited by this section.
146 For the reasons discussed in Part II.B, any state that attempted to constrain the out-of-
state political speech of firms incorporated within it would be disadvantaged in the competition
for corporate charters.
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against corporate political speech. Part III.B also suggests that this
analysis supplements the traditional "credible commitment" explana-
tion for the durability of Delaware's dominance in the market for cor-
porate charters. Finally, Part III.C contends that the unique institu-
tional features of the political economy of Delaware identified in Part
III.B result in a total social welfare gain.
A. The Incorporation Debate
There is a rich literature exploring the question of why most large
firms incorporate in Delaware. '4' The early view, championed most
prominently by Professor William Cary, was that the competition be-
tween the states to grant corporate charters led to a "race to the bot-
tom" in state corporate law. In the end, the argument goes, because
Delaware offered managers the corporate law most conducive to ex-
ploiting investors, managers incorporated in Delaware in order to fa-
cilitate the transfer of value from shareholders to themselves. In re-
turn, Delaware reaped the benefits of increased tax and licensing
revenues.'
Shortly thereafter, market-oriented scholars beginning with then-
Professor Ralph Winter challenged the intellectual underpinnings of
Cary's vision. 9 As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel put it, "how
could states' competition to please managers be the only well-
functioning market?"' 0 Managers also compete in the market for cor-
porate control and the market for capital. Their success in both will, in
significant measure, be determined by their ability to navigate the firm
successfully in the market in which the firm sells its products. There-
fore, to keep the cost of capital down, which facilitates the firm's com-
petitiveness in the product market, and to keep the firm's stock price
high, which facilitates the managers' competitiveness in the market for
corporate control, managers would choose to incorporate in the state
that provided the optimal bundle of shareholder protective law. In
other words, the demand function for corporate law represents the ag-
147 See, for example, Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev 709 (cited in note 14); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corpo-
rate Law, 105 Harv L Rev 1437 (1992); Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate
Charters: History and Agency, 15 Del J Corp L 885, 903 (1990); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org 225
(cited in note 14); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for
Bill Cary, 37 U Miami L Rev 187 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited-
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporate Law, 76 Nw U L Rev 913 (1982);
Ralph K. winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J
Legal Stud 251 (1977); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Dela-
ware, 83 Yale L J 663 (1974).
148 Cary, 83 Yale L J 663 (cited in note 147).
149 Winter, 6 J Legal Stud 251 (cited in note 147).
150 Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 213 (cited in note 11).
1140 [69:1103
2002] Competition for Corporate Charters 1141
gregation of shareholder rather than managerial preferences. So the
fact that most large publicly traded corporations chose Delaware
meant that Delaware provided the most efficient corporate law.
To say that competitive forces will result in optimal state law is a
strong thesis, however-one that has been embarrassed somewhat by
the proliferation of state antitakeover laws."' But the thesis of the
"race to the top" scholars may be recharacterized as suggesting that
the competition between states for incorporations pushes the states
towards law that benefits shareholders. In that formulation, as a mat-
ter of theory, the advocates of the race to the top appear to be the
winners."' To borrow Judge Winter's articulation, if the competition
between the states for corporate charters has not led to a "race" for
the top, then it has at least led to "a leisurely walk" in that direction."
Moreover, so far as any of this is empirically verifiable, "The data are
... most consistent with Winter's hypothesis of the efficacy of competi-
tion." 5 Delaware corporate law appears to improve firm valuer'
151 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 Va L Rev 111, 118 (2001) (noting the increase in state laws that per-
mit use of defensive tactics by incumbent management to stymie takeovers); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from
Takeovers, 99 Colum L Rev 1168, 1187 (1999); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 726-28 (cited in
note 14); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 265-66 (cited in note 14). Still, Delaware's sluggish
adoption of a considerably weaker statute than average suggests that the competition between
the states does push towards shareholder-beneficial law. Roberta Romano, The Need for Compe-
tition in International Securities Regulation, 2 Theor Inq in L 387, 529-37 (2001); Roberta
Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L
Rev 843, 855-59 (1993); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 730-31 (cited in note 14); Daniel R.
Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti- Takeover Statutes the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause,
and Insider Trading, 1987 S Ct Rev 47,68-71; Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Take-
over Statutes, 73 Va L Rev 111, 141 (1987). Consider also the story of how institutional investors
in large Pennsylvania corporations forced widespread opting-out of Pennsylvania's rigid anti-
takeover law. Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 535-37; Romano, 61 Fordham L Rev at 858-59; Leslie
Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Protection, NY Tunes Al (July
20,1990).
152 Fischel, 1987 S Ct Rev at 70 (cited in note 151) (suggesting that "competition among
states creates a powerful tendency for states to enact laws that operate to the benefit of inves-
tors").
153 Even Lucian Bebchuk has conceded that "state competition produces a race for the top
with respect to some corporate issues." Bebchuk, 105 Harv L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 147). See
also id at 1457; Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 481 (cited in note 90) ("[T]he corporate feder-
alists convincingly refute the implicit assumption of the reformist theory that legal rules which
enhance the discretion of managers inevitably harm the welfare of shareholders.").
154 Ralph K.Wimter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 Colum
L Rev 1526,1529 (1989) ("In fact, the history of state antitakeover statutes may support the view
that the race to the top is a leisurely walk.").
155 Romano, 61 Fordham L Rev at 848-49 (cited in note 151). See also Romano, 2Theor Inq
in L at 494-507 (cited in note 151); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 732-37 (cited in note 14).
156 See generally Robert Daires, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J Fm Econ
525(2001).
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Still, the market for corporate charters, like virtually all markets,
is imperfect, and not only because of the agency between managers
and shareholders that has been the principal focus of most of the first
generation of regulatory competition scholarship. ' Regardless of
one's take on the Cary/Winter debate about how well market forces
align managers' and shareholders' interests, Delaware's durable cor-
porate law leadership is not fully explainable by the attractiveness of
its law to managers one way or the other. Put another way, whether
managers select Delaware because its law permits them to transfer
value from shareholders to themselves, or because its law favors
shareholders and therefore reduces the cost of capital, there must be
other reasons apart from the content of its code that explain Dela-
ware's continuing dominance. For other states have attempted to
mimic Delaware's corporate code,"8 and although they have attracted
a nontrivial number of reincorporations, they have not substantially
lessened Delaware's preeminence.59 So various commentators have
pointed to Delaware's credible commitment to continue to service
corporate needs,'" its proficient judiciary,6' the learning and network
externalities growing out of the accumulation of experience with
Delaware law, 62and the disincentive for other jurisdictions to innovate
157 See, for example, Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 752-53 (cited in note 14).
158 See, for example, Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters, 68 U Cin L Rev 1061, 1067-68 (2000); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L
Rev at 488 (cited in note 90); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 246 (cited in note 14) (referring to
Nevada as the "Delaware of the West").
159 See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 Del J Corp L
965, 1011 (1995) ("Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation'). See also
<http:lwww.state.de.us/corp/index.htm> (visited Sept 25, 2001) ("More than 308,000 companies
are incorporated in Delaware including 60 percent of the Fortune 500 and 50 percent of the
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Alma Cohen,
Imperfect Competition and Agency Problems in the Market for Corporate Law table 2, working
paper (2001), available online at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index.html> (visited
May 5,2002). But see Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corpo-
rate Law, working paper (2002), available online at <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/
law-econ/workingpapers/PDFpapers/kamar-spr02.pdf> (visited May 3, 2002) (suggesting that
what exists in reality is a far cry from the vigorous state competition that the literature depicts).
On managerial perceptions of differences (or lack thereof) across jurisdictions, see Romano, 1 J
L, Econ, & Org at 269-70,278 (cited in note 14).
160 Romano, Genius of American Corporate Law at 37-38 (cited in note 14) ("Delaware's
preeminence in the corporate charter market results from its ability to resolve credibly the
commitment problem in relational contracting'); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 273-81 (cited
in note 14); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 721-24 (cited in note 14).
161 Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 276-78 (cited in note 14). See also Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev
1061 (cited in note 158); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw U L Rev 542, 590 (1990). This is usually a reference to the Delaware Chancery
Court, 75 percent of whose docket consists of corporate law cases. Alva, 15 Del J Corp L at 903
(cited in note 147).
162 See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va L Rev 713, 763-64 (1997); Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 841-47
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stemming from the ease with which Delaware could copy that innova-
tion.u Both the learning and network externalities phenomenon and
the ability of Delaware to copy other states' innovations, in particular,
have been urged as bases for imperfection in the market for corporate
charters.'" In this search for additional reasons for Delaware's persis-
tent prominence, however, scholars have not explored Delaware's
regulation of corporate political speech and the comparatively weaker
position of its legislators to issue extortive threats as an integral com-
ponent of its credible commitment to continue serving corporate
needs.
B. Corporate Political Speech and the Credible Commitment
The traditional account of Delaware's credible commitment,
which is most closely associated with Professor Roberta Romano, fo-
cuses on Delaware's relative dependence on franchise tax revenue as
well as its extensive and sunk investment in legal and judicial capital."
The idea is that this dependence and investment is pledged as a hos-
tage, as it were, to signal a serious commitment to maintain a high-
quality corporate code. But this account represents an oversimplifi-
cation of the political process. Individual legislators cannot fully inter-
nalize the benefits of increased tax revenues, which are in effect a pub-
lic good, 67 and this is true even if the state is small and increasing
(1995).
163 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 154-55 (cited in note 151). Delaware is quick to
copy successful innovations, William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S Cal L Rev
715,741-42 (1998) ("Delaware is not the first mover on most corporate law changes, but a quick
follower of successful innovations."), though not innovations that stymie takeovers, Romano, 2
Theor Inq in L at 531-32 (cited in note 151) ("[I]n contrast to its position as an innovator of cor-
poration code provisions, Delaware has persistently been a laggard behind other states in the
takeover statute context.").
164 On the latter, see Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 154-55 (cited in note 151):
Consider the decision of Montana whether to make a major commitment to developing a
better takeover regime with the attendant judicial and legal infrastructure that would be a
necessary prerequisite. Montana might reason that if it develops such a regime and makes
the necessary investments, then Delaware might just match these developments.
For a general discussion of the former, see Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination
in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L Rev 1205 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum L Rev 1908 (1998). But see
Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 507-26 (cited in note 151).
165 See Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 273-81 (cited in note 14); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev
at 721-24 (cited in notel4); Romano, Genius of American Corporate Law at 37-44 (cited in note
14).
166 Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 235-36, 240-41 (cited in note 14) (stating that "these
states are hostages to their own success" and producing data to support this proposition);
Romano, Genius of American Corporate Law at 38-39 (cited in note 14). For a general discus-
sion, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 163-205 (Free Press
1985).
167 See Fischel, 1987 S Ct Rev at 69 (cited in note 151) ("From the perspective of individual
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revenue without a corresponding increase in local taxes tends to favor
the reelection of incumbents. Yet much of the existing literature sim-
ply assumes that the behavior of the relevant individual lawmakers
will be shaped by the collective state interest in attracting incorpora-
tions.'6' This section assimilates the McChesney economic model of
regulation into the corporate regulatory competition debate. In so do-
ing, this section further develops the existing literature's application of
the traditional model. The aim is to offer a more nuanced approach to
evaluating the comparative advantage in the competition for corpo-
rate charters provided by Delaware's unique political economy.
The starting point is the observation that the extortion-based po-
litical economy of the Tillman Act and its state analogues offered ear-
lier is consistent with Delaware's not similarly discriminating against
corporate political speech.16' Extortive threats by Delaware legislators
against firms with their physical assets elsewhere but that are incorpo-
rated in Delaware are less credible than similar extortive threats by
legislators in other states. Credible extortive threats require inde-
state legislators, increased revenue from franchise taxes is something of a public good."); William
J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J Legal Stud 303,308
(1997) ("Legislators will face a trade-off between increasing franchise fee revenues by attracting
and retaining corporate chartering revenues with a low-cost statute free of interest group deals,
on the one hand, and increasing political support from interest groups, on the other.").
168 Professor Fischel has made this observation about the literature generally, see Fischel,
1987 S Ct Rev at 69 (cited in note 151), and Professor Coffee has made a similar observation re-
garding Professor Romano in particular, John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism:
State Competition and the New Trend toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 Cardozo L
Rev 759, 761-62 (1987), though elsewhere Romano has embraced an interest-group-based ap-
proach. See, for example, Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 533-34 (cited in note 151); Romano, 73 Va
L Rev at 122-37 (cited in note 151). Still, the assumption animates much of the literature, see, for
example, Bebchuk, 105 Harv L Rev at 1454 (cited in note 147) ("[T]he appropriate assumption is
that a state's interest in attracting incorporations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually
involved in the state's lawmaking process."), though not all of it, see, for example, Carney, 26 J
Legal Stud 303 (cited in note 167).
169 Note, however, that to say that there is no discrimination against corporations is not to
say that there are no limits on them. The same contribution and expenditure rules that apply to
anyone else in Delaware apply to corporations as well. See 15 Del Code Ann § 8023 (1999) (gov-
erning independent expenditures); 15 Del Code Ann § 8010 (1999) (governing contributions to
candidates). See also note 3. So it would perhaps be better to say that in Delaware, corporations
face a more even playing field than, say, on the federal level. Corporations in Delaware, like
natural persons, need only identify themselves as the sponsor of an independent expenditure;
and corporations may make contributions to political campaigns in the same amounts as natural
persons. In contrast, corporations may make no contributions or even independent expenditures
in connection with federal elections. 2 USC § 441b (1994).The relative effect of the generally ap-
plicable contribution limit in Delaware contained in 15 Del Code Ann § 8010(a), moreover, is
tempered by 15 Del Code Ann § 8010(b), which imposes relatively narrow caps on the ability of
political parties to aid Delaware candidates. The only other relevant provision in Delaware is 15
Del Code § 8012(e) (1999), which is something of a veil-piercing rule. Corporate donations will
be charged against the individual contribution limits of any shareholder owning in excess of 50
percent of the company's stock.
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pendent alternative consumers of legislation,'70 and with respect to
corporate law, Delaware legislators have few alternative interest
group sponsors.'7' On the federal level and in most other states, in con-
trast, there are numerous interest groups that regularly compete with
managers on corporate law issues, perhaps most importantly labor:n
Thus, just as the lack of competing lobbies in Delaware means that in-
vestors and managers need not fear efforts by others to obtain legisla-
tive rents at their expense through the enactment of private interest
provisions in the corporate code (the traditional economic model of
regulation),"' the lack of competing lobbies in Delaware means that
investors and managers need not worry about extortive ultimatums by
Delaware politicians either (the McChesney model). In New York,
however, not only is there exposure to rent seeking by labor unions in
the form ot say, large-shareholder statutory liability for employee
wages,'7" but there is also exposure to rent extraction by politicians in
the form of threats to enact such provisions."5 All else being equal,
Delaware therefore offers a friendlier environment. Managers may di-
rectly agitate for amendments to the corporate code without exposure
to either traditional rent seeking by other lobbies or McChesney-style
rent extraction by politicians.
In reply one might argue that if Delaware legislators have no-
where else to turn, they will focus their rent extraction on corpora-
tions. But such efforts would be hampered by the lack of leverage
stemming from the absence of alternative interest group patrons. This
contrary story is also inconsistent with Romano's hostage analysis.
Once again the traditional and McChesney economic models of regu-
lation converge with mirror-image analyses. Just as Delaware lawmak-
ers "risk[ ] killing the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg" by
adopting too much private interest law, 1 they would similarly risk the
170 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 38-41 (cited in note 13) (discussing different
forms of political credibility and political opportunism).
171 See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-63 (cited in note 168) ("Another distinctive fact
about Delaware as a jurisdiction is the relative absence of countervailing lobbies."); Macey and
Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 490 (cited in note 90).
172 As Professor Yadlin observes, the popular voting power of the members of these lobbies
adds to their power and to the credibility of a legislative threat to align with their interests. Yad-
lin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1174-76 (cited in note 80).
173 See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-63 (cited in note 168); Carney, 26 J Legal Stud at
308 (cited in note 167).
174 NY Bus Corp L § 630 (McKinney 1986). See Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-63 (cited
in note 168).
175 That the movement to restrict direct corporate campaign contributions first began in
New York and on the federal level-and that it was in these jurisdictions that corporate inter-
ventions at the turn of the century were at their most massive-lends further support to the anti-
extortion basis for the statutes suggested in Part II.
176 Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 505 (cited in note 90) (noting this constraint on
Delaware in the related context of its willingness to placate the lawyer lobby). See also Carney,
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incorporation business by engaging in extortive ultimatums-and
Delaware lawmakers take a uniquely long-term perspective on the
necessity of preserving the state's incorporation business.'" Moreover,
even if corporate law scholars and sophisticated investors can articu-
late good reasons for Delaware's continued corporate law dominance,
Delaware nevertheless faces an ongoing potential popular legitimacy
problem. A Delaware campaign donation frenzy-whether sparked by
traditional interest group rent seeking or by McChesney-style political
rent extraction-risks giving popular salience to the question of the
propriety of Delaware's ongoing corporate law hegemony and thus
risks a consequent increased possibility of federalization.'
78
Alternatively, against this one might argue that there are compet-
ing interests in Delaware, such as its legal community.1 But the core
interest of the Delaware bar is in preserving Delaware as the domi-
nant place of incorporation."* Institutional investors, too, are powerful.
But their interest in Delaware legislation is similarly tied to the ability
of Delaware lawmakers to keep large corporations incorporated there,
and the selling of their shares will often be a sounder strategy towards
change than lobbying a state legislature. In short, "satellite industries"
cannot provide extortive leverage, because their Delaware orbit is a
function of the strength of Delaware's gravitational pull on out-of-
state firms.'
81
In Delaware, moreover, with the possible exception of takeover
statutes-it is home to both potential bidders and targets-corporate
demand for legislation is more or less homogeneous in the weak sense
26 J Legal Stud at 308 (cited in note 167) ("Delaware faces high elasticity of demand for efficient
corporate laws and relatively low elasticity of demand for private benefits, except from corporate
lawyers. Under these conditions, Delaware will attempt to maximize the chartering of foreign en-
terprises, subject to provision of some benefits to corporate lawyers."); Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev
at 764 (cited in note 168) (observing that private-interest lawmaking in Delaware is "subject to
the obvious limitation that, if the Delaware law were made unattractive to corporations, the cor-
porate migration to Delaware will end").
177 See, for example, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate
America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough?: A Response to Kahan &
Kamar's Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L Rev 1257,1268-71
(2001).
178 Compare Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 764 (cited in note 168) (observing that in the
1970s, when federal intervention "was a real prospect," Delaware lawmakers responded accord-
ingly). See also Fischel, 76 Nw U L Rev at 923-45 (cited in note 147) (suggesting that the Dela-
ware courts responded to Cary's original criticism of Delaware).
179 See Carney, 26 J Legal Stud at 306-07 (cited in note 167) ("Two interest groups have
dominated the development of American corporate law-corporate lawyers and corporate man-
agers.").
180 See Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 534 (cited in note 151); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev
at 505 (cited in note 90); Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 764 (cited in note 168). See also Larry E.
Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 Del J Corp L 999, 1007-17
(1994).
181 Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-64 (cited in note 168).
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that it is limited to an interest in corporate law. This is not to say that
all managers of Delaware corporations want precisely identical law. In
fact, we know that they do not, as evidenced by the move towards a
highly enabling and permissive code full of default rules.'2 Rather, the
point is that Delaware is not in the business of regulating the ongoing
business activities of the firms it charters, so a Delaware legislator
cannot pit one set of managers against another by threatening activity
regulation."' Importantly, the overwhelming majority of firms incorpo-
rated in Delaware have their operating units and physical assets else-
where. Hence their interest in Delaware lawmaking extends only to
the extent of its corporate law, and the reach of Delaware with regard
to these companies likewise extends only to the regulation of their in-
ternal affairs."' This means that Delaware is not a likely forum for lob-
bying by firms for legislation that transfers wealth between them. To
repeat, Delaware's contact with most firms is limited to the provision
of corporate law. In contrast, a federal legislator who sits on a commit-
tee that superintends, say, the telecommunications industry, could pit
MCI against AT&T and hold up both for donations. Thus, even though
in a typical jurisdiction from a corporate perspective the Tillman Act
and its state law counterparts might be desirable because they par-
tially shield corporations from rent seeking by competitors and rent
extraction by politicians,"' that dynamic is not present in the unique
political environment of Delaware. Similar shielding in Delaware is
therefore unnecessary. Moreover, in the absence of a political dynamic
that requires shielding from the rent seeking of competitors and rent
extraction by politicians, corporations do better without discrimina-
tion against corporate political speech. As discussed below, this facili-
tates lobbying for the occasional necessary amendment to the corpo-
rate code."6
Against this, Professor Omri Yadlin suggests that, even if Dela-
ware is not in the business of activity regulation, the prior paragraph's
weak assumption of homogeneity is false even within the demand for
corporate law. Hence, Professor Yadlin suggests that Delaware legisla-
tors could attempt to "divide and conquer" by introducing amend-
ments on divisive issues of corporate law." But that threat is more hy-
pothetical than real. There is a strong legislative norm in Delaware in
favor of deference to the Corporate Law Section of the Bar Associa-
182 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1179-80 (cited in note 80).
183 See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 55-66 (cited in note 13).
184 Compare Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 490 (cited in note 90).
185 See Parts II.B and II.D.
186 See Part III.C
187 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1176-80 (cited in note 80).
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tion,le and amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law
are recommended only "when there is a demonstrable consensus in
the corporate community that such changes are advisable."' It is
therefore likely that none of Professor Yadlin's hypothetical divide-
and-conquer proposals would ever get before the legislature. In effect,
issues of Delaware corporate law for which there is no strong consen-
sus-the sort of issues that would invite rent seeking and political rent
extraction-are punted to the Delaware courts. This further reduces
the potential for both traditional rent seeking and McChesney-style
political rent extraction."'
Moreover, the constitutional requirement in Delaware of a two-
thirds vote of both houses of the legislature to amend the General
Corporation Law also diminishes the credibility of extortive threats
generally and the likelihood of a divide-and-conquer strategy in par-
ticular.1 91 In conjunction with the strong norm of deference to the Cor-
porate Law Council of the state bar, that requirement cuts the legs out
from under an extortive threat made by an individual or by a small
group of legislators, because it ensures that the status quo is relatively
stable. 9' True, the two-thirds requirement might make more credible a
threat to hold out once legislation is on the precipice of passage." But
such an ex post holdout threat is less likely than simple ex ante extor-
tion, because the ex post threat is highly visible and subject to sanction
in internal Delaware politics."' Furthermore, as an empirical matter,
188 Alva, 15 Del J Corp L at 904-16 (cited in note 147); Andrew G.T. Moore, II, State Com-
petition, Panel Response, 8 Cardozo L Rev 779,780-81 (1987). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L
at 534 (cited in note 151); Romano, 73 Va L Rev at 141 (cited in note 151).
189 Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1268-70 (cited in note 177) ("In areas where a consensus
emerges ... Delaware's Corporate Law Council will generally draft and obtain swift passage of
legislative amendments. When there is no consensus, however, they will not."). Indeed, this norm
further curtails legislative avenues for extortion by reducing the likelihood of committee hear-
ings and other legislative functions that facilitate shakedowns. Compare McChesney, Money for
Nothing at 39-40 (cited in note 13).
190 Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev at 1092-94 (cited in note 158); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at
500-02 (cited in note 90). Of course, this requires a high level of trust in the quality of the Dela-
ware judiciary, a point made by Professor Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 80), and
explored in greater detail by Professor Fisch, 68 U Cin L Rev at 1068 (noting Delaware's "spe-
cialized and expert judiciary which provides both rapid and high quality litigation decisions").
191 Del Const Art IX, § 1 ("No general incorporation law, nor any special act of incorpora-
tion, shall be enacted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each
House of the General Assembly."). See Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 241-42,273-79 (cited in
note 14); Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 721-22 (cited in note 14).
192 See Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 489 (cited in note 90) ("[C]orporations need not
fear that Delaware will change its perspective on corporate law whenever there are small
changes in the political complexion of the state legislature.").
193 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 80).
194 Compare id at 1185 (cited in note 80) (stating that Delaware has "a large constituency
whose main interest is in expanding the number of firms incorporated in Delaware").
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the ex post holdout problem has not materialized. Delaware has had
no trouble making swift amendments to its corporate code.'9
That Delaware corporations might still be subject to political rent
extraction by legislators in the jurisdictions in which the corporation
locates its operating units does not undermine this analysis. The claim
here is not that incorporation in Delaware somehow insulates the
corporation from political rent extraction everywhere. Rather, the
claim is that with respect to corporate law, Delaware is desirable be-
cause it does not discriminate against corporate political speech and
yet extortive ultimatums concerning corporate lawmaking are
unlikely. Thanks to the internal affairs doctrine, the decision where to
incorporate need not be tied to the decision where to locate the physi-
cal assets of the firm. So firms make the decision where to locate their
operating units independently of the decision where to incorporate.
The potential for legislative rent extraction thus becomes one of many
relevant factors in each separate decision. Delaware's responsive cor-
porate lawmaking process and its reduced likelihood of political rent
extraction regarding corporate law are relevant and attractive consid-
erations in favor of Delaware when making the incorporation deci-
sion.
C. The Social Welfare Effect
The foregoing analysis reveals a positive social welfare conse-
quence of corporate law federalism. Occasional amendments to the
relevant governing corporate code (highly enabling and permissive
though it may be) are a necessary input for firms that assume the cor-
porate form. The combination of few competing bidders and the fail-
ure to discriminate against corporate political speech lowers the cost
of that input, if not by increasing the avenues through which it might
be purchased, then by offering a jurisdiction in which reform may be
sought without exposure to extortionate demands. Put another way,
Delaware's political dynamic not only protects corporations from ex-
tortive threats, but it also increases the odds of successfully agitating
for legislative changes to Delaware's corporate law without triggering
a cascade of rent extraction. This is an appealing characteristic of
Delaware, because from time to time legislative amendment to the
corporate code will improve shareholder welfare. For an illustration,
one need only think of Smith v Van Gorkom and section 102(b)(7) of
195 See Carney, 71 S Cal L Rev at 741-42 (cited in note 163) (noting that Delaware is "a
quick follower of successful innovations"); Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev at 489 (cited in note
90) ("At the same time, a blocking minority is unlikely to develop to stop needed changes in re-
sponse to unforeseen conditions. The supermajority rules have not obstructed Delaware's ability
to alter its law in response to changing circumstances."); Romano, 1 J L, Econ, & Org at 233-42
(cited in note 14). See also Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1268-70 (cited in note 177).
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the Delaware code.'9 In a sense, the debate over campaign finance
laws may be viewed as an empirical question about the scope of rent
extraction versus the informative value of lobbying activity. In Dela-
ware, the informative value of lobbying activity appears to outweigh
the potential costs of rent extraction.
True, the magnitude of this effect may be diminished by the prac-
tice of deference to the bar in corporate law matters, because that
practice lessens the need to lobby the legislature directly. And as Pro-
fessor Yadlin observes, the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds
majority to amend the Delaware General Corporation Law might
provide a countervailing force towards an increased price for legisla-
tive amendments.'" But it remains true that initiating a revision to the
Delaware General Corporation Law does not invite extortive ultima-
tums in the same way that it would in New York or in other more
populous jurisdictions. Moreover, as a practical matter, the likelihood
of Delaware legislators using the two-thirds requirement as leverage
to increase the price of corporate legislation is small. When there is
"demonstrable consensus in the corporate community" in favor of an
amendment, it is recommended by the bar and swiftly enacted.d
The more troublesome objection to this analysis is that in light of
the shareholder/manager agency problem, Delaware's unique setup
might facilitate management's ability to obtain law detrimental to
shareholder welfare. An apposite analogy would be to lowering the
price of burglary tools by making that market more efficient. There
are, however, at least three problems with this argument. First, to
premise a social welfare analysis on the assumption that regulatory
competition results in law that harms shareholders is to assume sig-
nificant failure in the capital markets and runs contrary to the empiri-
cal studies showing otherwise. As Professor Robert Daines has re-
cently shown, Delaware law improves firm value.n There remain, of
course, arguments against accepting this implication of Daines's and
related empirical studies-for example, the argument that incorporat-
ing in Delaware might improve firm value because of network effects
or other factors unrelated to Delaware's code. But none "refute[s]
196 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985); 8 Del Code Ann § 102(b)(7) (2001). See Roberta Romano,
Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 29 Emory L J 1155,1160 (1990).
197 Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1185 (cited in note 80).
198 Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1268-70 (cited in note 177). See also text accompanying
notes 188-89.
199 See Daines, 62 J Fin Econ at 555 (cited in note 156). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L
at 494-507 (cited in note 151).
200 See, for example, Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 138-39 (cited in note 151); Kahan
and Kamar, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1229 & n 104 (cited in note 164).
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the empirical findings that Delaware law and, hence, competition for
charters have provided shareholders with economic benefits.' ' 0'
Second, the ability of managers to make direct donations to
Delaware legislators without exposure to extortive ultimatums has
not, as a historical matter, led to managerial hijacking of Delaware's
legislative process to the detriment of shareholders. Takeover statutes
provide a good case study, because those dubious of regulatory com-
petition are especially fearful about excessive takeover protection.mIn
contrast to states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina,
each of which enacted specific statutory takeover impediments at the
behest of the managers of a single local company,2 there has been no
comparable enactment in Delaware. In fact, With regard to statutory
takeover protection generally, "Delaware has persistently been a lag-
gard behind other states."' Thus the disciplining force of capital mar-
kets, the diversity of opinion on the takeover issue, the unwillingness
of the Delaware bar to recommend amendments without "demon-
strable consensus," and/or some confluence of these and other ele-
ments of Delaware's political economy appear not to have facilitated
a deluge of pro-management legislation in Delaware,2' and this de-
spite the lack of discrimination against corporate political speech. The
analogy to lowering the price of burglary tools, in other words, does
not hold up. The experience thus far in Delaware suggests that its po-
litical economy-including the lack of discrimination against corpo-
rate political speech coupled with the unlikely prospect of political
rent extraction-is amenable to swift enactment of amendments that
promote shareholder welfare, but not to enactment of legislation de-
signed to benefit management at the expense of shareholders.
201 Romano, 2Theor Inq in L at 507 (cited in note 151).
202 See text accompanying notes 235-237.
2 Robert M. Daines, Do Classified Boards Affect Firm Value?: Takeover Defenses after the
Poison Pill at 10-12, working paper (2001) (on file with author) (Massachusetts: Norton Com-
pany); First Union Is Seeking Change in State Law over Wachovia Deal, Wall St J A10 (June 14,
2001) (North Carolina: First Union and Wachovia); Carrick Mollenkamp, First Union Added by
North Carolina with Fast New Law, Wall St J B2 (June 14,2001) (same); Floyd Norris, Southern
Levitation: Battling Banks' Shares Keep Rising, NY Times Cl (July 27,2001) (same); Romano, 73
Va L Rev at 122-37 (cited in note 151) (Connecticut: Aetna Insurance). For a general discussion,
see Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Antitakeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate
Charters, 1988 Wis L Rev 365.
2W Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 531-32 (cited in note 151). As Vice Chancellor Strine has
observed:
[L]awyers from several states are presently marketing the fact that their state corporation
laws allow "bulletpoof" antitakeover defensive measures, whereas Delaware's does not.
Why has Delaware not responded in kind? ... I would suggest that Delaware has not re-
sponded because self-interested Delawareans believe that a more balanced approach is es-
sential to maintain their competitive advantage.
Strine, 86 Cornell L Rev at 1269 (cited in note 177) (footnote omitted).
M5 See Romano,2Theor Inq in L at 533-34 (cited in note 151).
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Finally, even if competition between the states did push towards
law detrimental to shareholder welfare (though both rigorous and
casual empiricism regarding the Delaware experience suggests the
contrary), it would still be in shareholders' best interests for the pur-
chase of that law to be free from minatory legislators. Legislative ex-
tortion would only exacerbate the problem, because at some level the
demand for corporate law is inelastic-it is necessary for any firm
wishing to incorporate. No good comes from introducing a second set
of faithless agents to the transaction. That would simply double the
potential sources of agency costs to be borne by shareholders.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Part discusses the implications for three current policy de-
bates of shifting the focus over corporate political speech from the
shareholder/manager agency problem to the society/lawmaker agency
problem. First, Part IV.A briefly discusses the current political debate
about banning corporate (and other) soft-money donations.2 Second,
Part IVB briefly discusses the current academic debate about issuer
choice of law in securities regulation. Third, Part IVC offers a com-
prehensive analysis of the current academic debate over whether to
enact an optional federal corporate takeover law. This more compre-
hensive analysis may be viewed as a case study, as it were, in the appli-
cation of this Article's analysis to other problems.
A. Soft-money Bans
The foregoing analysis suggests at least two related points for the
current political debate about whether to ban corporate soft-money
donations. First, protecting shareholders from managerial disloyalty is
not a good policy justification for banning soft-money donations. The
debate should focus instead on the impact, if any, of a soft-money ban
on corporate rent seeking and political rent extraction.
Second, the foregoing analysis may help explain the counterintui-
tive recent endorsement by numerous corporate executives of a ban
on corporate soft-money donations.2' It may also help explain the
206 Such a ban is at the core of the McCain-Feingold bill as well as the recently enacted
Shays-Meehan bill. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 ("McCain-Feingold"), S 27,
107th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 22,2001), in 147 Cong Rec S 2630-56 (Mar 21,2001); Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2001 ("Shays-Meehan"), HR 2356, 107th Cong, 2d Sess (June 28,2001), in
148 Cong Rec H 369-411 (Feb 13,2002). The House passed the Shays-Meehan bill by a 240-189
vote. See 148 Cong Rec H 465-66 (Feb 13,2002). The Senate passed the Shays-Meehan bill by a
60-40 vote. See 148 Cong Rec S 2161 (Mar 20,2002).
2W See Sanders, Many Businesses Root for Reform, LA Times at Cl (cited in note 47)
("[P]rivately, many corporations and their lobbyists-even if they now donate millions a year-
are rooting for the McCain-Feingold bill" that they hope will "rescue them from an aspect of the
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similarly counterintuitive announcement by a number of large corpo-
rations, including General Motors, Ford Motors, Monsanto, Tune War-
ner, Dell, Cisco, and IBM, that they will forbear from making soft-
money donations. m Massive soft-money donations were largely un-
known before the 1988 Bush-Dukakis presidential election." Hence, it
is not surprising that, several election cycles later, managers are be-
ginning to push towards having them banned and the argument in-
cludes an anti-extortion component. Indeed, there are strong parallels
between the movement to ban soft-money today and the 1907 enact-
ment of the Tillman Act. As detailed earlier, the Tillman Act was en-
acted in a burst of political entrepreneurship in the wake of publicly
salient and rampant corporate interventions in the presidential elec-
tion of 1904. These interventions represented an exaggerated applica-
tion of a fundraising technique developed less than twenty years ear-
lier. Similarly, McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan owe their passage
in large part to political entrepreneurship in the wake of publicly sali-
ent and rampant corporate soft-money donations that represent an
exaggerated application of a fundraising technique more or less in-
vented in 1988.
Both the collective action dynamic identified in Part II.B and the
extortion dynamic identified in Part II.D are discernible in the rheto-
ric of today's soft-money debate. Evidence of the former includes
statements by managers that "[m]ost business today would prefer not
to give. But there's not going to be unilateral disarmament. 2t ° With
fund-raising treadmill that they particularly resent: 'soft-money' donations to political parties");
Don Van Natta, Jr., Executives Press for Political Finance Change, NY Tunes Al (Sept 1, 1999)
(reporting that Senator Mitch McConnell, "one of the Senate's most ardent opponents of a bill
that would overhaul the campaign finance system," was conducting a letter-writing campaign to
business executives who supported the bill to attack their views); Don Van Natta, Jr., Executives
Seeking Caps on Donations Stand Strong, NY Times A22 (Oct 5,1999) (explaining that Senator
McConnell's letter-writing campaign against business executives who support campaign finance
reform legislation backfired and, instead, stirred support in the business community for this legis-
lation); John B. Judis, Whatever Happened to Noblesse Oblige?, New Republic 17 (Mar 27,2000)
(discussing business executives' support of Senator McCain's proposal for ending soft-money
contributions to political campaigns). Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for
Economic Development, Investing in the People's Business at 4,33-35 (cited in note 139), urges
this reform, and it has been endorsed by a nontrivial group of corporate executives. See Commit-
tee for Economic Development, Campaign Finance Reform: Investing in the People's Business,
available online at <http'J/www.ced.org/projects/cfr.htm> (visited May 5,2002) (recommending
an elimination of soft money); Committee for Economic Development, Endorsers of the CED
Campaign Finance Reform Proposal, available online at <http://www.ced.org/docs/
endorsers.pdf> (visited May 5, 2002) (listing 313 DEC trustees and their colleagues who en-
dorsed the CED's Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform).
208 See sources cited in note 47.
209 See sources cited in note 139. See also Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 248-
49 (cited in note 39) (detailing soft-money spending in recent elections).
210 T. Christian Miller, Business Efforts to Ban 'Soft Money' Turn Squishy Politics; The
Movement to Stop Unregulated Contributions to Political Parties Falters, LA Times A4 (Oct 16,
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regard to the latter, consider the following excerpt from an editorial
by Edward Kangas, then the Global Chairman of Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, published in 1999 by the New York Times:
What has been called legalized bribery looks like extortion to us.
... I know from personal experience and from other executives
that it's not easy saying no to appeals for cash from powerful
members of Congress or their operatives. Congress can have a
major impact on businesses .... The threat may be veiled, but the
21
message is clear: failing to donate could hurt your company.
Kangas's argument strongly implies that an extortion dynamic
similar to that which helped prompt the Tillman Act is at work today.
More generally, when evaluating modern proposals for campaign fi-
nance reform as remedies for the society/lawmaker agency problem,
not only should the proposals' predicted effects on rent seeking (in
the classic model) be considered, but so should the predicted effects
on political rent extraction (in the McChesney model). Additional in-
sight is available, in other words, from drawing on both traditional and
212
modern learning on the economic theory of regulation. Putting the
effect, if any, of banning soft-money on rent seeking by interest groups
to one side, the analysis of Part II suggests that an additional argu-
ment in favor of a corporate soft-money ban is that it would enhance
shareholder welfare by making more difficult the extraction by legisla-
tors of large corporate soft-money donations. This argument, of
course, is not a show-stopper. The market will eventually find a way to
212
clear, and the substituted approach may be even less desirable. Con-
sider that the use of corporate PACs to evade the Tillman Act means
that many corporate donations today are subject to fewer corporate
governance checks than they would have been without the Tillman
214Act. Still, analysis of the political economy of the venerable dis-
crimination against corporate political speech helps illuminate addi-
tional considerations relevant to the current debate about whether to
enact a ban on corporate soft-money donations.
2000). See also Edward A. Kangas, Soft Money and Hard Bargains, NY Times A27 (Oct 22,1999)
("Increasingly, fund-raisers also make sure you know that your competitors have contributed,
implying that you should pay ... to stay competitive.").
211 Kangas, Soft Money, NY Times at A27 (cited in note 210). See also Richard S. Dunham,
Campaign Finance Reform: Can Business Break the Logjam?, Bus Wk 49 (Apr 5,1999) (quoting
Sara Lee CEO John H. Bryan as calling political fundraising "legal bribery").
212 Compare Strauss, 94 Colum L Rev at 1380-82 (cited in note 13); Strauss, 1995 U Chi Le-
gal F at 152-55 (cited in note 13).
213 See McChesney, 6 Indep Rev at 359-61 (cited in note 13).
214 See text accompanying note 53.
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B. Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation
There is a burgeoning scholarly debate over issuer choice of law
in securities regulation. ' In particular, several scholars have proposed
changing the choice of law rule for securities transactions so that the
216parties could choose the law that would govern their transaction. The
basic idea, most clearly evident in Professor Roberta Romano's pro-
posal, is to engender a securities law regulatory competition similar to
that for corporate law. The underlying theory is that, just as share-
holders have benefited from corporate law regulatory competition, in-
vestors would similarly benefit from a securities law regulatory com-
petition. 217 Indeed, Romano has self-consciously embraced the analogy,
because the interests and incentives in the two settings are simi-
lar: the object of protection of both regimes is the financial inter-
est of investors, and under competition, investors' preferences
will dictate the choice of regulator because insiders who require
investment capital will bear the higher capital cost of an investor-
unfriendly regime choice. 
218
Without getting embroiled in the details of the various proposals,
there is an important insight for this debate to be found in Part III.
For a securities law regulatory competition experiment completely to
replicate the success of the corporate law experience, more will be
needed than just a mandatory federal rule compelling a securities law
215 See, for example, Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L 387 (cited in note 151); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L J 2359 (1998);
Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach
of Securities Regulation, 71 S Cal L Rev 903 (1998); Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, The
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw J Intl L & Bus 207 (1996);
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 Cal L Rev 279
(2000); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 Theor Inq in L 563 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, Re-
taining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va
L Rev 1335 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: US Disclosure
Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich L Rev 696 (1998); Merritt B. Fox, Securities
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 Mich L Rev 2498 (1997);
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va L Rev 1453 (1997); Alan R. Palmiter, To-
ward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 Colum Bus L Rev 1; James D. Cox, Regula-
tory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum L Rev 1200 (1999); Amir N. Lict, Genie in a
Bottle?: Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities Transactions, 2000 Colum
Bus L Rev 51; Sokol Colloquium: The Privatization of Securities Laws, 41 Va J Intl L 517 (2001).
216 Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2362-63,2418-24 (cited in note 215); Choi and Guzman, 71 S
Cal L Rev at 950 (cited in note 215). Professor Merritt Fox's proposal is nominally different, be-
cause his choice of law would depend on the nationality of the issuer. Fox, 97 Mich L Rev at 733
(cited in note 215). But the nationality of the issuer can be manipulated, so his proposal allows a
"range of choice as well." Edmund NV. Kitch, Proposals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An
Overview, 41 Va J Intl L 629,632-34 (2001).
217 See Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2361 (cited in note 215). See also Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L
at 493 (cited in note 151).
218 Romano, 2Theor Inq in L at 493 (cited in note 151).
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equivalent to the internal affairs doctrine. ' A state, presumably
Delaware, will need to replicate the various institutional features of
Delaware's corporate lawmaking process that ensure the rapid enact-
ment of needed reforms without vulnerability either to classic rent
seeking or to McChesney-style political rent extraction. Those features
evolved over time, thanks to the natural competitive pressures of the
market for corporate charters. The development of a similar market
for securities regulation, however, was blocked by the 1933 and 1934
Acts.a So an important question is whether the institutional features
of Delaware that keep many of the public choice legislative patholo-
gies in check could develop in a securities law regulatory competition
if one were initiated today.
This is not a trivial point. The high-stakes securities law equiva-
lent of corporate takeover protection is class action securities fraud
litigation. Therefore it should not be surprising that there is strong an-
ecdotal evidence of substantial political rent extraction (in the
McChesney model) and/or interest group rent seeking (in the tradi-
tional model) in connection with the most recent federal securities law
reforms-the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 and
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.2' It is similarly
unsurprising that the same kind of evidence exists concerning Califor-
nia's contemporaneous Proposition 211, which would have revised
California's blue sky laws.22 Two points should be made here.
First, the potential upside to a securities law regulatory competi-
tion is substantial, not only because it may benefit investors for all the
same reasons that corporate regulatory competition has benefited in-
219 Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2401-05 (cited in note 215).
2M Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 22,48 Stat 78, codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 77a et
seq (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 291, 48 Stat 881, codified as amended at
15 USC §§ 78a et seq (1994). See Kitch, 41 Va J Intl L at 637 (cited in note 216).
221 See Bill McAllister, California Is Golden for Clinton; President Raises Money from
High-Tech Industry, Rival Securities Lawyer, Wash Post A29 (Sept 27, 1998); Leslie Eaton, The
Silicon Valley Gang, NY Times D1 (June 11, 1998); Jeffrey Taylor, Accountants' Campaign Con-
tributions Are About to Pay Off in Legislation on Lawsuit Protection, Wall St J A22 (Mar 8,1995);
Jeffrey Taylor, Senate Clears Securities-Suit Curbs, Wall St J A3 (June 29, 1995). On the reforms,
see Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-353, 112 Stat 3227, codi-
fied in various sections of title 15 (2000); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L
No 104-67,109 Stat 737, codified at 15 USC §§ 77a et seq (2000); Richard W. Painter, Responding
to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes ofAction, 84 Cornell L Rev
1 (1998).
222 Bill Ainsworth, Firms Chip in $500,000 to Beat 211, Recorder 1 (Oct 4, 1996); Mark
Simon, How Tech Leaders Talk Politics, SF Chronicle A19 (Nov 13, 1997); Elizabeth Corcoran,
High-Tech Executives Seek More Political Clout, Wash Post G1 (July 4, 1997); Elizabeth Cor-
coran, California Voters Reject Proposition 211; Silicon Valley Fought Measure Making Share-
holder Fraud Suits Easier, Wash Post D3 (Nov 7 1996). See also Painter, 84 Cornell L Rev at 38-
39 (cited in note 221). On the proposition itself see Retirement Savings and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Prop 211, 1995-96 Reg Sess, 1996 Cal Legis Serv No 10, at A-20 (West) (defeated in
general election of November 5,1996).
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vestors, but also because the public choice pathologies that Delaware
has managed to minimize in corporate law appear to plague the cur-
rent system of securities regulation. Opening the regulation of securi-
ties to jurisdictional competition creates the possibility of competitive
forces pushing a jurisdiction towards the evolution of a political econ-
omy in which these pathologies are similarly minimized. Second, even
though the potential benefits are high, the costs of the process by
which the experiment would be put into place will likely be high as
well. Consider the likely scope of the deadweight losses from the rent
seeking and political rent extraction that would be prompted by any
debate on the requisite federal implementing legislation. Because
many of the relevant interest groups (such as the plaintiffs' bar and fi-
nancial intermediaries) are now well organized, there is risk of their
distorting any jurisdiction's efforts to replicate the salutary institu-
tional features of Delaware's corporate lawmaking process-efforts
that would be directed at stymieing their influence.
These problems need not be resolved here. The point is to flag
them for future study. The benefits to shareholders of corporate regu-
latory competition are so clear as to make out a prima facie case for
experimenting with a similar regulatory competition in securities law.
But before moving towards that experiment, it will be worth giving at-
tention to the political economy considerations relevant to the enact-
ment of the requisite federal implementing legislation as well as the
political economy of the underlying jurisdictional competition that
would ensue.
C. Optional Federal Takeover Law
The foregoing analysis also sets up a strong criticism of Lucian
Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell's recent proposal to enact a federal law of
corporate takeovers. This criticism holds even if the federal regime
were optional, as they suggest it should be. The core of the Bebchuk
and Ferrell proposal is an optional substantive federal takeover law
coupled with a mandatory federal procedural law. Under the manda-
tory procedure, shareholders of all corporations could choose between
the otherwise applicable substantive state takeover law regime and
the optional substantive federal law. Making the substance of the fed-
eral law optional is ingenious, because the option answers the objec-
tion that a mandatory federal law would stifle innovation and more
generally would preempt choice."m At the same time, making the
2 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 113 (cited in note 151) ("[W]e identify a novel form
of federal intervention in the regulation of takeovers-'choice-enhancing intervention'-that
can address [the shortcomings of state takeover law].").
224 It does, however, open them to new criticisms other than those raised below, on which
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shareholder choice procedure mandatory would in effect create a
fifty-first regulatory regime that, at least so far as takeover law is con-
cerned, would compete with the fifty statesS Hence, in Bebchuk and
Ferrell's view, even if one were to disagree with their contention that
their optional federal law is indeed superior to Delaware's, enactment
of their proposal would be harmless. This last claim is their "so what?"
defense: it allows them to reply with "so what?" to any argument that
the substance of a federal regime will not be any better.n
The problem with their proposal is that it is accompanied by only
"a brief look" at the relevant political economy considerations.n A
closer look at those considerations as developed in this Article reveals
a serious weakness in their analysis, one that answers their "so what?"
claim. Despite the optional character of their proposal,2 a closer look
at the relevant political economy considerations shows that there is
still significant risk that it will diminish shareholder welfare.
Before addressing the weaknesses in their "brief look" at the
relevant political economy considerations, however, it will be worth-
while first to consider more generally their rejection of the efficacy of
state competition in general. "Whether state competition overall cre-
ates pressure to adopt good or bad regulation," write Bebchuk and
Ferrell, "we would expect Delaware, the victorious state, to offer
shareholders a somewhat better deal. ''n9 Thus, they write, "It might be
that regulatory competition has pushed the states in a negative direc-
tion, with the victorious state, Delaware, being slightly better than the
others."' What is more, they contend, no state has the proper incen-
tives to compete with Delaware, because Delaware could easily copy
any innovation.' Any state that tries will find itself merely serving as a
stalking horse for improvements to Delaware law.
That Delaware law could be "slightly better than the others,"
however, is inconsistent with regulatory competition pushing "the
states in a negative direction." Recall that the argument why competi-
tion between the states might lead to bad law is that the interests of
see Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law,
87 Va L Rev 961,981-91 (2001).
225 The true number of competitors is of course much smaller, because the Model Business
Corporation Act states share identical law. For a general discussion, see Carney, 71 S Cal L Rev
715 (cited in note 163) (detailing substantial corporate law uniformity across the states).
226 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 149-50 (cited in note 151) ("[C]hoice-enhancing in-
tervention does not present the danger of imposing on shareholders arrangements even worse
than those that state law currently mandates.").
227 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 117 (cited in note 151).
228 Professor Yadlin, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1188-90 (cited in note 80), argues that the proposal
in effect is not optional.
229 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 138 (cited in note 151).
230 Id at 139.
231 See note 164.
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the consumers of that law, managers, are not sufficiently aligned with
the interests of their principals -shareholders. Thus the suppliers of
that law, the states (or, more accurately, the aggregation of all the indi-
viduals who are responsible for lawmaking within the state), would ca-
ter to the preferences of managers.23 But if Delaware law is "slightly
better than the others," then managers are choosing law that is in fact
the best for shareholders of what is available. Why would Delaware
offer managers law that is "slightly better" than that of the other
states if managers did not in fact desire better law? To concede that
Delaware's success is related to its offering law that is at least "slightly
better than the others" is quite possibly to concede that there is at
least a "leisurely walk" to the top.24
Of course Bebchuk and Ferrell would reply that they do not con-
tend that there are no areas of corporate law in which regulatory
competition pushes towards law that is beneficial for shareholders.25
Rather, their argument is that in areas in which the divergence of in-
terests between shareholder and managerial interest is especially
acute-such as the law of takeovers and takeover defenses-
regulatory competition pushes towards law beneficial for managers
rather than shareholders. In these areas states will cater to managerial
rather than shareholder preferences, because it is on this dimension of
the competition between the states that managers rest their reincor-
poration decisions.m Thus, according to Bebchuk and Ferrell, the pro-
liferation of antitakeover statutes and case law permissive towards de-
fensive tactics such as the poison pill, far from being a temporary ab-
erration, is in fact the natural consequence of regulatory competi-
tion.m
One might object to this analysis based on the fact that Dela-
ware's takeover statute is significantly less restrictive than most.m One
might also reply that recent scholarship suggests that the poison pill
232 See Part III.A.
233 Indeed, Bebchuk and Ferrell suggest that, "even if managers were to invest no resources
in lobbying for favorable state takeover law, state takeover law would likely be attuned to their
interests." Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 158 (cited in note 151). See also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 Va L Rev
993,1003 (2001).
234 Compare Romano, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 752-53 (cited in note 14).
235 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 130-32 (cited in note 151). See also Bebchuk, 105
Harv L Rev at 1440,1457 (cited in note 147) ("To be sure, because the interests of managers and
shareholders are somewhat aligned, there are many corporate issues with respect to which man-
agers seek, and states in turn have an incentive to provide, rules that enhance shareholder
value.").
236 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 133-35, 158 (cited in note 151); Bebchuk and
Ferrell, 99 Colum L Rev at 1197-99 (cited in note 151). See also Macey and Miller, 65 Tex L Rev
at 470 (cited in note 90).
237 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 131-32 (cited in note 151).
Z3 Romano, 2Theor Inq in L at 529-37 (cited in note 151).
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no longer makes much of a difference,29 and anyway Bebchuk and
Ferrell's discussion of the Delaware cases strangely omits important
recent (and more restrictive) Delaware decisions regarding the poison
pill.2 O The analysis here, however, will focus on a different point. Con-
sider again the last two sentences of the prior paragraph, because they
convey the ideas that form the basis for why in Bebchuk and Ferrell's
view federal intervention is so desirable.
More than merely adding any old fifty-first regulatory regime to
the competitive fray, their proposal would add a fifty-first competitor
who by definition would be unresponsive to the reincorporation dy-
namic that in their view drives the states towards takeover defense
permissiveness. Increased franchise tax revenues and the other bene-
fits that flow to individual states from attracting incorporations would
not accrue to the federal government upon the selection of its regime
by the shareholders of a particular corporation. The federal govern-
ment, in other words, has nothing to gain or lose from having its law
chosen. Thus, Bebchuk and Ferrell contend, "the chances that federal
officials would provide arrangements that are hospitable to takeovers
are higher than the probability that state officials would unilaterally
do so."" So why not offer a federal option that, if it is indeed more
hospitable to takeovers than state law, shareholders can choose to opt
into? If the federal option is not superior, then shareholders will sim-
ply demur (the "so what?" defense).4
The answer lies in the observation that Bebchuk and Ferrell fail
to address the fact that a federal takeover statute would not magically
leap from the pages of their article (or from the British City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers) into the United States Code. Any federal
takeover statute would instead go through the normal federal legisla-
tive process. This makes it necessary to compare the political economy
of the federal government to that of Delaware. An astonishing as-
239 See Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Pill:Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871 (2002). See also Romano, 2 Theor
Inq in L at 534-35 (cited in note 151); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Poison Pills and the European Case, 54
U Miami L Rev 839,841 (2000).
240 Their discussion of the Delaware cases, see Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 118-21
(cited in note 151), omits Paramount Communications, Inc v QVC Network, Inc, 637 A2d 34 (Del
1994), the most recent authoritative statement of the Delaware Supreme Court, a statement that
is less friendly to takeover defenses than their discussion allows. Also omitted in this context are
Carmody v Toll Brothers, Inc, 723 A2d 1180,1182 (Del Ch 1998) (invalidating a "dead hand" poi-
son pill on both statutory and fiduciary duty grounds), and Mentor Graphics Corp v Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc, 728 A2d 25,25 (Del Ch 1998) (invalidating a "no hand" poison pill of lim-
ited duration on fiduciary duty grounds).
241 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 158-59 (cited in note 151). See also Bebchuk, 105
Harv L Rev at 1500-01 (cited in note 147) ("In evaluating the relative performance of the fed-
eral law process, the best starting point is the observation that this process does not suffer from
the structural biases that afflict the performance of state competition.").
242 Bebchuk and Ferrell, 87 Va L Rev at 149-50 (cited in note 151).
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sumption of Bebchuk and Ferrell's analysis is that the relevant indi-
vidual federal lawmakers, in the absence of a collective federal inter-
est in attracting opt-ins, will have no agenda in their lawmaking other
than the public interest. That assumption is so crude as to call into
question the validity of the conclusions that rest upon it. Bebchuk and
Ferrell's conception of the national legislative process is therefore
open to two related criticisms-they are related in that they both
question the validity of assuming public-regarding federal legisla-
tors-though only the second, the one that is unique to this Article,
clearly meets their "so what" claim.
First, and this has been observed elsewhere, the collective action
asymmetry between shareholders and managers that affords managers
an advantage in lobbying would not disappear by nationalizing the
relevant lawmaking forum. In other words, the federal legislative
process is hardly immune to the very same political failure that "is the
linchpin of Bebchuk and Ferrell's critique of state competition."4 In-
deed, there is good reason to suppose that a federal statute would be
worse, because with respect to takeovers the interests of labor con-
verge with that of managers, and together they would present a formi-
dable national lobby." Still, this argument does not answer directly the
Bebchuk and Ferrell response of why not try? What have we to lose,
they would say, if the substance of the federal law is optional?
Second, and this is the criticism that grows out of this Article's
analysis, Delaware legislators are uniquely unable to issue extortive
ultimatums, something that cannot be said for federal legislators, pre-
cisely because federal legislators, unlike their state counterparts,
would be unresponsive to the reincorporation dynamic. Reincorporat-
ing in another state provides no escape from federal law. So the fear of
reincorporation provides no check against extortive threats by federal
legislators. For exactly the reason that Bebchuck and Ferrell suppose
that federal officials are more likely than state officials to supply law
that is hospitable to takeovers-the lack of revenue consequences for
federal lawmakers from shareholders' opting in or out of the federal
regime-federal officials could extort with impunity. And this is true,
as we shall see in a moment, even if the statute's substantive provi-
sions were optional. Thus, this criticism is an argument against even
trying. It is an argument, in other words, that answers their "so what?"
claim.
243 Romano, 2 Theor Inq in L at 537-43 (cited in note 151). See also Choi and Guzman, 87
Va L Rev at 972-78 (cited in note 224); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers:
Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U Cin L Rev 457,468-85 (1988) (explaining why it would be
a mistake to assume that national regulation would be an improvement).
244 Compare Coffee, 8 Cardozo L Rev at 762-63,769-71 (cited in note 168) (discussing the
likely influence of labor on takeover regulation).
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Before turning to that point, however, we should reconnect these
two strands of criticism. The commonality between them is the insight
from the study of public choice that the "federal government" does
not generate law-aggregations of individuals do. Bebchuk and
Ferrell's proposal strangely assumes that (i) these individuals have
nothing personally to gain from federal takeover legislation and (ii)
given this lack of personal interest, federal lawmakers will legislate in
the public interest. These assumptions run counter to the classic eco-
nomic theory of regulation and ignore the modern learning on that
subject altogether.
Given the ineffectiveness of reincorporation as a check on the
behavior of federal legislators, from the perspective of the modem
economic theory of regulation, a takeover proposal would be a fantas-
tic "milker" bill for the extortion of campaign contributions and other
forms of support.A' Casual empiricism confirms this worry: we have
evidence of just this kind of political rent extraction from the 1980s
takeover statute proposal. As Judge Douglas Ginsburg observed:
As the Reagan Administration's monitor of this legislation, I
could only conclude at the time that, while the bills may not have
been conceived as milker bills, they were surely pursued as such
once the members realized how lucrative they could be. Publicly
traded corporations on both sides of the issue, which is to say
tender offerors and takeover targets, began furiously throwing
favors at the relevant Congressmen for at least a few years while
246the threat (or promise) of legislation seemed credible.
Moreover, the record of the federal government's legislative
process in the closely related context of securities fraud regulation is
equally poor. Both the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 were
passed in the wake of rampant donations, by no means merely cost-
effective (from the donor's perspective) rent seeking, by numerous in-
terest groups. " The legislative process in Delaware, with its heavy reli-
ance on the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association,
245 Other terms besides "milker" that have been used include "cash cows," "juice bills," and
"fetchers." McChesney, Money for Nothing at 29-32 (cited in note 13). See also McChesney, 6
Indep Rev at 354-55 (cited in note 13).
246 Ginsburg, 97 Mich L Rev at 1774-75 (cited in note 84). See also McChesney, Money for
Nothing at 29-31 (cited in note 13) ("'Milker bills' is one term used by politicians to describe leg-
islative proposals intended only to 'milk' private producers for payment not to pass the rent-
extracting legislation."); Fred S. McChesney, Ever the Twain Shall Meet, 99 Mich L Rev 1348,
1357 (2001) (analogizing takeover proposals to threats to impose price control regulations on the
health care industry and concluding that "[p]rivate parties surrender money to politicians rather
than lose something of even greater value").
247 See note 221 and accompanying text.
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is by contrast especially ill-suited to shakedowns and unlikely to trig-
ger campaign donation frenzies.
The Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal would be a "milker," more-
over, even if the substance of the proposed rules were optional. This is
an answer to their claim that federal choice-enhancing legislation
would do no harm. Federal legislators could simply threaten to make
the option mandatory. As Professors Choi and Guzman have shown,
federal regulators would likely push for just that,2 making the threat
real. In contrast to Delaware, which requires a two-thirds legislative
vote to enact corporate legislation and will consider such legislation
only when it is put forward by the Bar Association based on demon-
strable consensus, on the federal level a threat by a small group of leg-
islators to amend the federal takeover statute would be more credible.
Perversely, an optional statute might be worse than a mandatory one,
because it would allow these legislators to threaten credibly to make it
mandatory at a future time.
This claim should not be overread. It is not meant to suggest a
tautological regress in which "mandatory rules are even worse than
optional rules because legislators may threaten to turn them into op-
tional rules (which are worse than mandatory rules)" and so on.29
Rather, the claim has two components. First, an optional statute would
double the number of jurisdictions whose takeover law could be rele-
vant in a future takeover battle, so the lobbying efforts of all inter-
ested parties in the classic model would be doubled. If Bebchuk and
Ferrell are correct that political failure on the state level leads to
managerial lobbying for, and then legislative enactment of, takeover
law that is detrimental to shareholder welfare, then all an optional
federal regime would do is double the aggregate amount of these
deadweight rent seeking efforts-and half of it would be doubly
wasteful, because only one takeover law regime would apply at any
given moment.
Second, with an optional federal takeover statute in place, the
threat to enact a mandatory one becomes more credible, not in the
trivial sense of reducing the costs of drafting a mandatory proposal,2
°
but rather because it puts the issue on the political agenda and gives it
popular salience. Although it is undoubtedly correct in a theoretical
sense that Bebchuk and Ferrell's optional takeover statute would not
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actually give legislators the power to do anything more than they
could do in the absence of such legislation, ' legislators do not act in a
vacuum. At any given moment the confluence of innumerable political
and other factors makes the threat of certain legislation more credible
than others. For example, in the wake of the Enron scandal,2 threats
to increase SEC oversight of the accounting profession are more
credible than they were immediately before the scandal. Similarly,
threats to enact price controls on health care services were more
credible when the Clinton Administration made a national health care
program a political priority than they would be today.23 The existence
of an optional takeover statute would bring the federal government
into the takeover law game, and once that happened, threats to enact
a mandatory version would become more viable. Indeed, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine significant layoffs in the wake of a well publicized hos-
tile takeover of a company whose shareholders had opted for state
law prompting calls for making the federal statute both tougher and
mandatory. In such an environment one would expect a rent seeking
and political rent extraction frenzy similar to that of the 1980s take-
over proposal and the 1995 and 1998 securities law reforms.
In the end, a federal takeover regime, optional or not, would
probably not offer shareholders any improvement. Moreover, its exis-
tence would double the number of jurisdictions in which the corpora-
tion would need to engage in lobbying and the number in which it
would be vulnerable to rent seeking by others and political rent ex-
traction by legislators. Put more generally, Bebchuk and Ferrell's
analysis focuses on the agency between managers and shareholders
without careful enough attention to the agency between citizens and
their legislators-and what the study of public choice teaches about
the latter agency relationship. Delaware's political economy, in con-
trast to that of the federal government, is less conducive to transfers
from shareholders to legislators. Unlike the agency between managers
and shareholders, which is policed by the market in addition to fiduci-
ary duties and elections, the agency between legislators and their con-
stituents is checked only by imperfect elections.
CONCLUSION
The underlying aim of this Article has been to shift the focus of
the policy debate over corporate political speech from the share-
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holder/manager agency relationship to the agency relationship be-
tween lawmakers and society. In view of that shifted focus, and draw-
ing on a contractarian view of the firm, the economic theory of regula-
tion, and the study of public choice, this Article explored the policy
bases for, and the political economy of, the law's ongoing discrimina-
tion against corporate political speech. This Article also explored the
relevance of the state law regulation of corporate political speech to
the competition for corporate charters. Specifically, this Article ad-
vanced four points.
First, this Article showed that the conventional justifications for
discriminating against corporate political speech are vulnerable to the
extent that they depend on a divergence of interests between share-
holders and managers. There is nothing special about managerial con-
trol over corporate political speech that warrants abandoning ordi-
nary modes of corporate governance in favor of a mandatory rule and
criminalization. Indeed, the only plausible argument growing out of
the conventional justifications for discriminating against corporate po-
litical speech is a fear of corporate rent seeking. The corporate form
may provide a comparative advantage in the market for legislation,
and this might justify discriminating against corporate political speech.
It is possible that corporations are especially pernicious seekers of
rents through regulation.
Second, this Article suggested a political economy story for the
law's ongoing and venerable discrimination against corporate political
speech consistent with the prior claim that the corporate form might
provide a comparative advantage in the market for legislation. This
Article showed that the statutory regulation of corporate political
speech was probably supported by corporations. To begin with, the
statutes solve the collective action problem if corporations as a class
do better without lobbying. More importantly, these statutes provide
partial shielding against political rent extraction by legislators. Draw-
ing on the relevant collective action dynamics, the economic theory of
regulation (including the traditional and the modern learning on that
subject), and a fresh look at the historical record, this Article adduced
argument and evidence in support of this analysis.
Third, by assimilating the role of local campaign finance regula-
tion into the corporate regulatory competition debate, this Article of-
fered a more nuanced approach to evaluating the comparative advan-
tages in the market for corporate charters provided by Delaware's
unique political economy. This Article suggested that Delaware's lack
of any corporation-specific campaign finance regulation, coupled with
certain unique institutional features of Delaware's corporate lawmak-
ing process, gives additional traction to the credible commitment ex-
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planation for Delaware's ongoing dominance in the market for corpo-
rate charters.
Finally, this Article discussed the implications of the foregoing
analysis for three current policy debates. First, the Article briefly dis-
cussed the current political debate about banning corporate soft-
money campaign donations. Second, the Article briefly noted several
analogous political economy issues relevant to the burgeoning aca-
demic debate about issuer choice of law in securities regulation. Third,
the Article comprehensively analyzed the pertinence of the foregoing
analysis for the current academic debate regarding the enactment of
an optional federal corporate takeover regime.
